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Abstract
This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade
credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows
the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem.
A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller
part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade
credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade
credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially
detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors,
leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer
and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated
and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are
statistically and economically significant.
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1. Introduction
Most firms in the United States offer their products and services on trade credit, which is the
single largest source of firms’ short–term financing (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Tirole,
2010). This paper examines how equilibrium trade credit provision depends on the strategic inter-
action among suppliers selling goods to the same customer (retailer). Since offering trade credit is
commonly perceived as a source of competitive advantage, one could conjecture that the stronger
the competition among suppliers, the greater their incentives to provide trade credit financing. Our
theory challenges this intuition by showing that while supplier competition is indeed an important
determinant of trade credit provision, suppliers that face more competition when selling to a given
customer offer this customer less, not more, trade credit.
Our model features multiple heterogeneous suppliers selling differentiated products to a retailer,
which resells these products to end consumers. The suppliers, as well as the retailer, face convex
cost of bank financing. As a result, each supplier can increase its sales and, potentially, profit by
providing the retailer with some trade credit. We show that in the presence of multiple suppliers,
the benefit of providing trade credit is not fully internalized by the trade creditor. The reason is
that after obtaining trade credit, the retailer can use the freed–up liquidity to buy more goods not
only from the trade creditor but also from other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem: Each
supplier bears the full cost of providing trade credit, whereas the benefit – larger spending by the
retailer – is shared among all suppliers.
The extent to which a supplier internalizes the benefit of providing trade credit depends on the
supplier’s share of the retailer’s expenditures. A supplier that is responsible for a larger share of
the retailer’s purchases internalizes a larger part of the benefit and, as a result, is willing to offer a
larger proportion of its goods on credit. The first empirical prediction of our model is, therefore, a
positive relation between trade credit provision and the supplier’s share of the retailer’s spending.
Most existing trade credit theories that consider the effect of supplier competition predict trade
credit provision to be negatively related to the supplier’s market power (see, e.g., Fisman and Raturi,
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2004; Dass, Kale, and Nanda, 2015; Fabbri and Klapper, 2016). A notable exception is Petersen
and Rajan (1997), who argue that a monopolistic supplier, which is more likely to internalize
the long-term benefit of helping customers, should be willing to provide more trade credit. This
argument is based on the supplier’s competitive position vis-a`-vis all firms in its industry – whether
they sell to the same customers or not. In contrast, we highlight the importance of the supplier’s
position among all firms selling to the same customers – regardless of their industry affiliations.
This contrast becomes most striking if one compares a retailer sourcing from multiple monopolistic
suppliers with a retailer sourcing from a single competitive supplier.
The second empirical prediction of our model links the use of trade credit by a retailer to the
concentration of suppliers’ shares of the retailer’s purchases. Because suppliers with larger shares of
the retailer’s expenditures are willing to sell more on credit, our model predicts a positive relation
between a retailer’s use of trade credit and its supplier concentration, measured by the Herfindahl
index (HHI) of suppliers’ shares of the retailer’s spending.
Existing studies that we are aware of and that link trade credit financing to supplier concen-
tration – Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2015) and Fabbri and Klapper (2016) – examine the effect of
suppliers’ bargaining power, proxied by supplier industry concentration, on trade credit provision.
In contrast, our prediction is about the concentration of suppliers’ selling shares at the customer
level, irrespective of whether the suppliers belong to the same industry.
The free rider problem arises even if suppliers sell unrelated products, as long as they compete
for the retailer’s cash. However, this problem becomes especially detrimental to the trade creditor
if the free-riding suppliers sell substitutable products and, thus, compete for the same end con-
sumers. This leads to our model’s third prediction, which is a negative relation between product
substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that these suppliers provide to
the retailer.
There are several theories that predict a positive relation between trade credit financing and
product differentiation in supplier industry. According to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), differenti-
ated goods are more difficult to divert for private benefits, which makes the supplier more willing to
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sell on credit. Cun˜at (2007) argues that differentiated goods are associated with higher switching
costs, which reduce buyer opportunism and increase the supplier’s willingness to offer trade credit.
Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2015) suggest that trade credit can be used as a commitment device for
the supplier to make relationship–specific investments, which are more important in industries that
produce differentiated goods.
There is a fundamental difference between these predictions and ours. The theories of Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004), Cun˜at (2007), and Dass, Kale and Nanda (2015) tie the advantage of trade
credit financing to the inherent nature of the transacted good, namely, its differentiation from all
other goods in the industry. In contrast, our theory is about product substitutability among sup-
pliers to a particular retailer. Consider, for example, a firm that sources several commodity–like
but mutually non–substitutable inputs, each from a different supplier. Given the commodity–like
nature of the inputs, all three aforementioned theories would predict little trade credit financ-
ing. Given that the inputs are not mutual substitutes, our theory predicts significant trade credit
financing.
To examine the economic significance of our predictions, we calibrate the model and examine
the relations between trade credit provision on the one hand and the distribution of suppliers’ shares
and substitutability among their products on the other hand using simulated data, while shutting off
all non-strategic factors related to trade credit choices. The results of this exercise suggest that the
effects predicted by the model are economically sizable. For example, a one–standard–deviation
increase in a supplier’s share of the retailer’s purchases leads to a 0.25–0.59 standard–deviation
increase in the proportion of the supplier’s output sold on credit. A one–standard-deviation increase
in the Herfindahl index of supplier shares is associated with a 0.26–0.49 standard–deviation increase
in the proportion of the retailer’s purchases financed by trade credit. A one–standard–deviation
increase in suppliers’ product substitutability leads to a 0.93–1.26 standard–deviation decrease in
the proportion of sales financed by trade credit.
We also provide suggestive empirical evidence of the association between the distribution of
supplier shares and substitutability among suppliers’ products on the one hand and trade credit
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provided by suppliers to retailers on the other, using samples of almost 600 retailer–year observa-
tions and almost 3,000 supplier–year observations, spanning a period of 14 years. Our matching of
suppliers with retailers is based on an extended version of Cohen and Frazzini’s (2008) customer–
supplier links. Our estimate of product substitutability among suppliers is based on Hoberg and
Phillips’ (2010, 2016) measure of pairwise similarity of firms’ product descriptions. When estimat-
ing the predicted relations, we control for various factors that have been shown in the literature
to be associated with trade credit provision, most important, for suppliers’ industry–level market
shares, suppliers’ industry concentrations, and product differentiation in suppliers’ industries.
Our empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions and suggest that interactions
among suppliers to a given retailer explain variation in the use of trade credit over and above
measures of supplier interaction at the industry level, highlighted by Petersen and Rajan (1997),
Fisman and Raturi (2004), Cun˜at (2007), Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2015), and Fabbri and Klapper
(2016). Within the sample of suppliers, trade credit provided by a supplier to its retailers is sig-
nificantly positively associated with the supplier’s share of retailers’ purchases and is significantly
negatively associated with product substitutability among suppliers selling to the same retailers.
These relations are economically non-negligible: a one-standard-deviation increase in supplier share
is associated with a 0.09 standard–deviation increase in trade credit provided, while a one–standard–
deviation increase in product substitutability is associated with a 0.11 standard–deviation decrease
in trade credit provided. Furthermore, within the sample of retailers, a one–standard–deviation
increase in a retailer’s HHI of supplier shares is associated with a 0.08 standard–deviation increase
in trade credit received by this retailer, and a one-standard-deviation increase in product sub-
stitutability among the retailer’s suppliers is associated with a similar reduction in trade credit
received by the retailer, both relations being statistically significant. These results are robust to
various changes in the set of control variables. They also tend to hold, but become weaker econom-
ically, when we replace the sample of retailers with a sample of wholesalers or a sample of corporate
customers that are neither retailers nor wholesalers.
The trade credit literature focuses mostly on explaining why firms use trade credit financing in
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the presence of banks specializing in financial intermediation. Existing theories argue thats suppliers
may have an advantage over banks in assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness (see, e.g., Smith, 1987;
Biais and Gollier, 1997; Chod, Trichakis, and Tsoukalas, 2017), monitoring borrowers’ revenue
(e.g., Jain, 2001), enforcing credit repayment (e.g., Cun˜at, 2007), renegotiating debt (e.g., Wilner,
2000), or salvaging repossessed inventory upon borrower’s default (e.g., Frank and Maksimovic,
2005). Other explanations of trade credit prevalence are based on moral hazard faced by buyers
(e.g., Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long, Malitz, and Ravid, 1993; Kim and Shin, 2012), moral hazard
faced by lenders (e.g., Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Chod, 2017; Fabbri and Menichini, 2016), price
discrimination (e.g., Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner, 1988), transaction costs (e.g., Ferris, 1981;
Emery, 1987), and risk sharing and supply chain coordination (e.g., Kouvelis and Zhao, 2012; Yang
and Birge, 2017).
Unlike the aforementioned literature, our paper does not attempt to provide a new rationale
for the use of supplier financing. Instead, it identifies an important strategic cost associated with
providing trade credit, which is due to competitive interaction among suppliers. By examining trade
credit provision by multiple competing suppliers, our study complements Brennan, Maksimovic,
and Zechner (1988), who show how suppliers can use trade credit to achieve market segmentation,
and Barrot (2016), who documents how imposition of exogenous constraints on trade creditors
affects their competitors. The notion that suppliers’ willingness to provide trade credit depends on
their ability to internalize its benefit is related to Petersen and Rajan (1995), who argue that banks
with greater market power tend to lend more because they are in a better position to internalize the
long–run benefits of providing credit to young and distressed firms. Unlike the argument of Petersen
and Rajan (1995), our theory does not assume anything about future interactions between lenders
and borrowers. In addition, our theory complements Petersen and Rajan (1995) by examining the
effect of product substitutability.
On a broader level, our paper contributes to the literature that links product market competition
and debt financing (see, e.g., Brander and Lewis, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Whereas
this literature studies the effect of competition on the amount of debt that firms issue, we examine
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the effect of competition on the amount of trade credit that firms provide.
2. Model
We consider N heterogeneous suppliers, each selling a distinct product to the same retailer.
The retailer then resells these products to end consumers. We assume linear consumer demand,
i.e., the retail market-clearing price of the product of supplier i (product i henceforth) is given by
pi (x) = αi − 1
t
xi + γ N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj
 for i = 1, . . . , N , (1)
where αi is the demand curve intercept, xi is the quantity sold of product i, γ ∈ [0, 1) measures
product substitutability and, therefore, the degree of competitive interaction among suppliers,
and t is the length of the time period. We explicitly model the time dimension so that we can
later simplify the analysis by focusing on the limiting case of instantaneous time period. Supplier
heterogeneity is captured by product-specific demand curve intercepts.
The retailer does not have any cash and relies on two sources of financing: bank credit and
trade credit from suppliers. The sequence of events is as follows. First, suppliers simultaneously and
independently set wholesale prices and trade credit limits. Second, the retailer chooses quantities
to be purchased from the suppliers, which the suppliers produce to order, and the amounts of
trade credit and bank financing. Finally, consumer demand is realized and the retailer uses sales
proceeds to repay the bank and the suppliers. All firms are value-maximizers and all cash flows
are expressed in present value terms. Next, we describe the retailer’s and the suppliers’ decision
problems in greater detail, starting with the retailer.
2.1. Retailer
After observing wholesale prices, w = (w1, ..., wN ) , and trade credit limits, T = (T1, ..., TN ),
the retailer chooses quantities to purchase from each of the N suppliers, x = (x1, ..., xN ). Because
the retailer does not have any cash of its own, it needs to finance the inventory cost,
∑N
i=1wixi,
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using a combination of trade credit and bank financing.
Bank Financing. We assume that the cost of bank credit is convex in the retailer’s leverage.
Convexity of the cost of debt financing emerges endogenously from several microeconomic foun-
dations. For example, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) among others, show that convexity of the cost of debt financing arises when creditors can
observe the firm’s cash flows only at a cost. Other rationales for convex cost of debt financing in-
clude agency problems (e.g., Myers, 1977), adverse selection (e.g., Stein, 1998), regulatory capital
requirements or managerial risk aversion (e.g., Becker and Josephson, 2016). For parsimony, we
adopt convex cost of bank credit by assumption without explicitly modeling its micro foundations.
Specifically, we assume that the bank interest rate increases linearly in the retailer’s book leverage,
defined as bank loan amount over the book value of the retailer’s assets, where the latter equals the
total cost of purchasing inventory,
∑N
i=1wixi. Thus, the interest rate, rR, that the bank charges
the retailer on a loan of size y over time period t equals
rR = tθR
y∑N
i=1wixi
, (2)
where θR > 0 is a parameter that affects the retailer’s cost of bank credit.
Trade Credit. Because the increasing marginal cost of bank financing limits the retailer’s
demand for suppliers’ goods, the suppliers have an incentive to provide trade credit to the retailer.
Reflecting the empirical regularity of low variation of trade credit terms within industries, we
assume that each supplier offers trade credit at a given industry-specific interest rate, rT = tθT ,
where θT is the trade credit interest rate per unit of time.
1
Following Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), we assume that each supplier sets a trade credit limit
beyond which it requires cash payment. Because the cost to the retailer of the first dollar of bank
1In practice, there are two common forms of trade credit contracts. Under “two-part terms,” the supplier offers the
buyer an early payment discount, which represents implicit trade credit interest. Under “net-terms,” the supplier
does not offer any such discount. According to Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999), the most common two-part contract
is “2/10 net 30,” which implies 2% interest rate for a 20 day period. Importantly, Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999)
document that trade credit terms tend to be standardized within industries, and majority of firms in their sample
change prices rather than trade credit terms in response to fluctuations in demand.
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credit is zero, the pecking order in the retailer’s optimal financing is to (i) first use bank credit; (ii)
once the marginal cost of bank credit reaches the trade credit interest rate, start using trade credit
along with bank credit; (iii) once the trade credit limit is exhausted, use additional bank financing.
Of course, if the trade credit limits set by suppliers are sufficiently high, there is no reason for the
retailer to use additional bank financing. As we show in Section 3.4, the retailer’s optimal financing
mix in this case depends only on the cost of bank financing relative to the industry–specific trade
credit interest rate, and not on the strategic interaction among suppliers, which is the object of
our study. Therefore, we now focus on the more interesting case in which all trade credit limits are
binding.2 This is the case when the following inequality holds in equilibrium:
rT < 2tθR
∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ti)∑N
i=1wixi
. (3)
The right-hand side of (3) is the marginal cost of bank financing when the retailer exhausts the trade
credit limits, borrowing
∑N
i=1 Ti from suppliers and
∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ti) from the bank. Condition (3)
guarantees that fully utilizing the trade credit limits minimizes the retailer’s overall cost of financing.
The retailer’s profit consists of two parts: (i) operating profit, which equals sales revenue net
of cost of goods sold, and (ii) financing cost, which is the sum of the cost of trade credit and bank
credit, i.e.,
ΠR =
∑N
i=1
(pi (x)− wi)xi −
rT∑N
i=1
Ti + tθR
(∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ti)
)2
∑N
i=1wixi
 , (4)
where the retail price pi (x) is given by (1) for i = 1, ..., N . The retailer chooses the optimal
quantities that maximize this profit, i.e.,
x∗ (w,T) = arg max
x≥0
ΠR (x,w,T) . (5)
2In Section 3.4 we show that in equilibrium, the retailer is either constrained by all trade credit limits, or by none
of them, and analyze the latter case formally.
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2.2. Suppliers
In the first stage, supplier i, i = 1, ..., N, chooses the wholesale price, wi, and the trade credit
limit, Ti, taking the actions of the other suppliers as given and anticipating the retailer to order
the equilibrium quantity, x∗i (w,T) , given in (5). Subsequently, the supplier produces quantity xi
at a constant marginal cost ci.
To model the cost associated with trade credit provision, we assume that the supplier’s produc-
tion cost, cixi, exceeds its cash revenue, wixi−Ti, and the supplier needs to obtain financing for the
remaining amount, cixi−wixi +Ti.3 We further assume that, similar to the retailer, suppliers face
convex cost of financing. In particular, supplier i can borrow from a bank at an interest rate that
is linear in the supplier’s leverage, defined as the amount borrowed over the book value of assets,
where the latter equals the cost of producing inventory, cixi. The interest rate faced by supplier i
that borrows cixi − wixi + Ti for time period t is, therefore,
rSi = tθS
cixi − wixi + Ti
cixi
, (6)
where the financing cost parameter, θS , is assumed to be the same across suppliers.
The profit of supplier i consists of three parts: (i) sales revenue minus cost of goods sold, (ii)
interest earned on trade credit provided, and (iii) cost of the supplier’s own bank financing, i.e.,
ΠSi = (wi − ci)xi + rTTi − tθS
(cixi − wixi + Ti)2
cixi
. (7)
The equilibrium strategy of supplier i is given by
w∗i , T
∗
i = arg max
wi,Ti≥0
ΠSi
(
x∗i
(
wi,w
∗
−i, Ti,T
∗
−i
)
, wi, Ti
)
, (8)
where ΠSi is given in (7), x
∗
i is given in (5), and w
∗
−i and T
∗
−i are equilibrium wholesale prices and
trade credit limits set by the other suppliers.
3We verify that the condition cixi > wixi − Ti is always satisfied in equilibrium for any i.
9
To examine the impact of supplier heterogeneity on trade credit provision, we allow suppliers to
be of different sizes, i.e., we allow αi 6= αj for i 6= j. However, we assume that α1/c1 = α2/c2 = ... =
αN/cN ≡ m, where m captures suppliers’ profitability.4 As we show below, absent any strategic
interactions, suppliers that differ in size (αi) but have the same profitability (αi/ci) provide the
same amount of trade credit as a proportion of their sales. This is important because it guarantees
that any differences in the relative amount of trade credit that these suppliers provide in equilibrium
are due exclusively to the suppliers’ strategic interaction, which is the focus of our study.
3. Equilibrium and comparative statics
Because the equilibrium conditions in their general form are too complex to provide insights,
we focus on the limiting case in which the length of the time period, t, approaches zero. In this
case, sales quantities, xi/t, trade credit limits, Ti/t, interest rates, rR/t, rSi/t, and rT /t, and
profits, Πi/t, can be all interpreted as instantaneous rates. Therefore, the fundamental trade-off
between using bank financing and trade credit is preserved, and the equilibrium proportion of
trade credit financing, T ∗i /w
∗
i x
∗
i , remains meaningful. In fact, as we show in Section 3.3, the first
best proportion of trade credit financing is independent of t. Importantly, because all equilibrium
variables are continuous in t for t > 0, all comparative statics obtained for this limiting case are
also valid for t small enough. In Section 4, we verify numerically that the results are robust and
economically significant under parameter values calibrated using annual sales and interest rate
estimates.
Before analyzing the effect of strategic interaction among suppliers on the provision of trade
credit, we consider a benchmark single-supplier scenario to understand what drives the equilibrium
amount of trade credit financing in the absence of strategic considerations.
Lemma 1 In the case of a single supplier, as t approaches zero, the equilibrium proportion of trade
4Absent any strategic interactions with other suppliers, supplier i’s equilibrium profit margin is (w∗i − ci) /ci =
(m− 1) /2.
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credit financing approaches the following limit:
lim
t→0
T ∗
w∗x∗
=
θS (m− 1) + θT
θS (m+ 1)− 2θR . (9)
Proof: All proofs can be found in Appendix A. 
As one would expect, the supplier provides more trade credit financing, relative to sales, as
its cost of bank financing, θS , decreases; or as the retailer’s cost of bank financing, θR, the trade
credit interest rate, θT , or the supplier’s profitability, m, increase. Notably, the proportion of trade
credit financing in the single supplier case is independent of α. As discussed earlier, this means
that any effects of heterogeneity in α’s on equilibrium trade credit provision stem exclusively from
strategic interaction among suppliers. Finally, note that in the case of a single supplier and t→ 0,
condition (3), which ensures that the retailer uses trade credit up to the limit, is equivalent to
θT < 4θR
(
1− θR
θS
)
1
m+ 1
. (10)
We assume inequality (10) to hold throughout our analysis of the limiting case of t→ 0.
The supplier sets trade credit limit so that the marginal cost of providing trade credit, i.e., the
difference between the supplier’s own marginal cost of funds, 2rSi , and the trade credit interest rate,
rT , equals the marginal benefit of trade credit provision, i.e., the profit from increased sales,
∂xi
∂Ti
(wi−
ci). In the next two subsections, we examine how the latter depends on supplier competition.
3.1. Free rider effect
In this subsection, we focus on the “free rider effect,” whereby each supplier providing trade
credit internalizes only a part of the benefit of increasing the retailer’s purchasing power. To isolate
this effect and, in particular, to differentiate it from the effect of strategic interactions among
suppliers in the product market, we begin by examining the case in which suppliers’ products are
independent, i.e., we assume γ = 0 throughout this subsection. In the next subsection, we not only
show that our findings continue to hold when the suppliers’ products are substitutes (γ > 0), but
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we also examine how trade credit provision depends on product substitutability.
Let SH∗i denote supplier i’s equilibrium share of the retailer’s spending (“supplier share” hence-
forth), and let HHI∗ denote the Herfindahl index of the equilibrium supplier shares, i.e.,
SH∗i ≡
w∗i x
∗
i∑N
k=1w
∗
kx
∗
k
and HHI∗ ≡
N∑
i=1
(SH∗i )
2 . (11)
The following proposition links the equilibrium amount of trade credit provided by each supplier
to the supplier share.
Proposition 1 As t approaches zero, trade credit provided by supplier i as a proportion of its sales
approaches the following limit:
lim
t→0
T ∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
=
θS (m− 1) + θT
θS (m+ 1)− 2θRHHI∗
(
1 +
2θR
θS
SH∗i −HHI∗
m+ 1
)
, (12)
and, therefore, suppliers with larger shares provide more trade credit as a proportion of their sales,
i.e.,
T ∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
>
T ∗j
w∗jx
∗
j
⇐⇒ SH∗i > SH∗j . (13)
The intuition is as follows. Suppose supplier i extends an additional dollar of trade credit to
the retailer. The retailer optimally uses the freed–up liquidity to simultaneously (i) reduce its bank
borrowing, (ii) purchase additional output from supplier i, and (iii) purchase additional output from
other suppliers. Thus, a free rider problem arises where the total benefit of increased spending by
the retailer is not fully internalized by the trade creditor, but is spread across multiple suppliers.
Importantly, a supplier with a larger share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a larger portion
of this benefit. Such a supplier is therefore willing to provide more trade credit relative to its sales.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium trade credit received by the retailer.
Proposition 2 As t approaches zero, the proportion of trade credit financing used by the retailer
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approaches the following limit:
lim
t→0
∑N
k=1 T
∗
k∑N
k=1w
∗
kx
∗
k
=
θS (m− 1) + θT
θS (m+ 1)− 2θRHHI∗ , (14)
and, therefore, is positively related to supplier concentration measured by the Herfindahl index of
supplier shares.
When the retailer’s spending is highly fragmented across suppliers, each supplier internalizes
only a small portion of the benefit of providing trade credit. This, in turn, reduces the amount of
trade credit that suppliers are willing to provide as a whole. With more concentrated suppliers,
larger suppliers are willing to provide more trade credit relative to their sales. Because these larger
suppliers also represent a larger share of the retailer’s spending, supplier concentration is positively
related to the overall proportion of trade credit in the retailer’s financing mix.
3.2. Product substitutability
In this subsection and throughout the rest of the paper, we allow suppliers’ products to be
substitutes, i.e., we allow γ ≥ 0. We first confirm that the relation between supplier shares and
their provision of trade credit continues to be positive when products are substitutes.
Proposition 1a At sufficiently small t, suppliers with larger shares provide more trade credit as a
proportion of their sales, i.e.,
T ∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
>
T ∗j
w∗jx
∗
j
⇐⇒ SH∗i > SH∗j . (15)
Showing a positive relationship between the retailer’s use of trade credit financing and supplier
concentration analytically for γ > 0 is difficult. However, we can do so for the special case of
symmetrical suppliers, in which the Herfindahl index of supplier concentration becomes the inverse
of the number of suppliers, i.e., HHI∗ = 1/N .
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Proposition 2a When suppliers are symmetrical and t is sufficiently small, the proportion of trade
credit financing, T
∗
w∗x∗ , increases in supplier concentration.
With fewer symmetrical suppliers, the share of each becomes larger, and so does the equilibrium
proportion of trade credit financing. To validate the positive relation between the retailer’s use
of trade credit and its supplier concentration in the case of asymmetric suppliers, in Section 4
we calibrate the model with typical values of the Herfindahl index of supplier shares, product
substitutability, and bank and trade credit interest rates.
We now examine the relation between the equilibrium provision of trade credit and product
substitutability. Because product substitutability is a key determinant of the intensity of compet-
itive interaction among suppliers, one could conjecture that as product substitutability increases,
greater competitive pressure would force suppliers to provide more trade credit. Our next propo-
sition challenges this intuition. For the sake of tractability, we assume here that suppliers are
symmetrical, but verify, as a part of our calibration exercise in Section 4, that the result is robust
to the case of asymmetric suppliers.
Proposition 3 When suppliers are symmetrical and t is sufficiently small, the proportion of trade
credit financing, T
∗
w∗x∗ , decreases in product substitutability among suppliers.
Recall that trade credit provided by any given supplier enables the cash constrained retailer to
increase cash purchases from all other suppliers. As shown above, this free rider problem reduces
the equilibrium provision of trade credit even if suppliers sell unrelated products. When suppliers
offer substitutable products and, therefore, compete not only for the retailer’s cash but also for the
same end consumers, the free rider problem becomes even more detrimental to the trade creditor.
The reason is that the additional output sold by the competing suppliers reduces the residual
consumer demand for the trade creditor’s own product and, therefore, the price at which it can
be sold. As product substitutability increases, this disadvantage of providing trade credit becomes
more significant, and suppliers’ willingness to offer trade credit financing decreases.
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3.3. First best financing
In the previous two subsections we established that a free rider effect and competitive interaction
among suppliers reduce suppliers’ willingness to offer trade credit. A natural question is then
whether competing suppliers underprovide trade credit relative to the first best. As we show
below, the answer is not obvious. To facilitate the exposition, we assume symmetrical suppliers
throughout this subsection.
Even before defining the first best, it is useful to formally characterize the effect of supplier
competition on trade credit provision by comparing our base–case N–supplier scenario with the
case in which a single supplier sells all N products. Because one can think of such a supplier
as a result of the merger of N independent suppliers, we denote the equilibrium solution in the
single–supplier scenario by superscript M . For consistency, we use TM to denote the equilibrium
amount of trade credit that the single supplier offers per product.
Lemma 2 At sufficiently small t, multiple competing suppliers provide less trade credit relative to
their sales than a single supplier of the same products, i.e.,
T ∗
w∗x∗
<
TM
wMxM
. (16)
As expected, N competing suppliers underprovide trade credit relative to a single N–product
supplier, which internalizes the entire benefit of the retailer’s increased spending. This of course
does not imply that competing suppliers underprovide trade credit relative to the first best, since
it is not obvious how the amount of trade credit provided by a single supplier, whose incentives are
not aligned with those of the retailer, relates to the first best.
Regardless of the number of suppliers, the equilibrium solution deviates from the first best along
two dimensions: quantities produced and trade credit provided. Because coordination of production
among suppliers and a retailer is outside the scope of our paper, we focus on the second dimension.
In particular, we define the first best financing as the amount of trade credit per product, TFB,
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that minimizes the total financing cost of the suppliers and the retailer for any given w and x, i.e.,
TFB (w, x) = arg min
T>0
[
tθS
(cx− wx+ T )2
cx
+ tθR
(wx− T )2
wx
]
. (17)
Under first best financing, the marginal cost of bank credit must be the same for the retailer and
for the suppliers, i.e., the retailer and the suppliers must pay the same interest rate to the bank.
The next lemma compares the equilibrium and first best trade credit provision in the case of a
single supplier that sells all N products.
Lemma 3 At sufficiently small t, there exist thresholds m¯ < ∞ and r¯T < ∞ such that a single
supplier overprovides trade credit relative to the first best, i.e.,
TM
wMxM
>
TFB
(
wM , xM
)
wMxM
, (18)
if and only if m > m¯ or rT > r¯T .
Whether a single supplier overprovides or underprovides trade credit relative to the first best
depends on its profitability, m, and on the trade credit interest rate, rT . When profitability and/or
the trade credit interest rate are high, the supplier’s incentive to extend trade credit to increase
sales and/or interest revenue is so strong that it leads to overprovision of trade credit beyond the
first best.
How the equilibrium amount of trade credit provided by multiple competing suppliers compares
with the first best therefore depends on two potentially conflicting forces described in the previous
two lemmas: (i) a supplier’s incentive to provide trade credit is reduced by the free rider and
competitive interaction effects; (ii) absent any strategic considerations, a supplier may have an
incentive to overprovide trade credit beyond the first best to boost its sales and/or interest revenue.
The next proposition characterizes the interplay of these two forces.
Proposition 4 At sufficiently small t, there exist thresholds N¯ <∞ and γ¯ < 1 such that multiple
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competing suppliers underprovide trade credit relative to the first best, i.e.,
T ∗
w∗x∗
<
TFB (w∗, x∗)
w∗x∗
, (19)
if and only if N > N¯ or γ > γ¯.
When the number of suppliers is small (i.e., each supplier is responsible for a substantial share
of the retailer’s purchases) and their products are not strong substitutes, the equilibrium use of
trade credit financing may exceed the first–best level. When, however, the number of suppliers is
sufficiently large (i.e., the selling share of each supplier is sufficiently small) or their products are
sufficiently strong substitutes, the free rider and competitive interaction effects prevail, and the
equilibrium provision of trade credit falls below the first–best level.
3.4. Ample trade credit
So far, we have focused on the case in which all suppliers’ trade credit limits are binding in
equilibrium. In this subsection, we explore the alternative scenario, in which the retailer chooses
not to use trade credit up to these limits. To do so, we need to write the retailer’s problem in (4)
in a more general fashion. Let Ui be the amount of trade credit from supplier i that the retailer
uses. The retailer’s problem is then
U∗,x∗ = arg max
x,U≥0
ΠR (U,x) subject to Ui ≤ Ti for i = 1, ..., N, where (20)
ΠR =
∑N
i=1
(pi (x)− wi)xi −
rT∑N
i=1
Ui + tθR
(∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ui)
)2
∑N
i=1wixi
 . (21)
Recall that our analysis so far has assumed that the retailer uses up each of the trade credit limits,
i.e., U∗i = Ti for each i. Now suppose that the trade credit limit of supplier j is non-binding, i.e.,
0 < U∗j < Tj ≤ wjxj . Because U∗j is an interior solution, it must satisfy the first-order optimality
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condition, ∂ΠR∂Uj = 0, which can be written as
2tθR
∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ui)∑N
i=1wixi
= rT . (22)
This condition ensures that the retailer’s marginal cost of bank credit equals the trade credit
interest rate, rT . Intuitively, if rT were lower (higher), the retailer would be better off by increasing
(reducing) Ui by one dollar, while reducing (increasing) its bank borrowing by the same amount.
Note that at any given w, x, and U, we have ∂ΠR∂U1 =
∂ΠR
∂U2
= ... = ∂ΠR∂UN , i.e., when U
∗
j satisfies
the interior optimality condition, ∂ΠR∂Uj = 0, so does U
∗
i for each i 6= j. In other words, when the
retailer is not constrained by one of the trade credit limits, it is not constrained by any of them.
Intuitively, if the retailer wanted to use more trade credit, it could always obtain more trade credit
from supplier j. The fact that the retailer does not do so, means that its marginal costs of bank
credit and trade credit are the same and, therefore, none of the existing trade credit limits affects
the retailer’s payoff.
It follows immediately from (22) that the equilibrium proportion of trade credit financing used
by the retailer, ∑N
i=1 U
∗
i∑N
i=1w
∗
i x
∗
i
= 1− θT
2θR
, (23)
depends only on the exogenous parameters determining the retailer’s cost of trade and bank credit.
In particular, it is independent of supplier share concentration, HHI∗, as well as product substi-
tutability, γ. It further follows from (22) that U∗ is generally not unique: any U such that
∑N
i=1 Ui
satisfies (22), also satisfies ∂ΠR∂Ui = 0 for all i, and is therefore optimal. In other words, unless the
retailer uses trade credit from each supplier up to the limit – a scenario we analyzed as the base-case
model in Sections 3.1–3.3, its payoff depends only on the total amount of trade credit,
∑N
i=1 Ui,
and not on how much of it comes from each supplier. Therefore, absent trade credit rationing, our
model does not provide any predictions regarding the amount of trade credit extended by suppliers.
We have considered the cases in which the retailer’s marginal cost of bank credit is either
greater than or equal to the trade credit interest rate; see conditions (3) and (22), respectively.
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To complete the formal analysis, note that there is a third, less interesting scenario, in which the
retailer’s marginal cost of bank credit is lower than the trade credit interest rate and the retailer
uses no trade credit at all. In summary, all predictions of our model apply to the first case, in
which the retailer’s cost of bank financing and, thus, its demand for trade credit are high, and, as
a result, suppliers ration trade credit strategically.
4. Model calibration
To derive analytical results in the previous section, we had to rely on several restrictive assump-
tions. First, our analysis assumed that the length of the time period t is short enough. Second,
the relation between the Herfindahl index of supplier shares and the amount of trade credit used
by the retailer was derived under two alternative assumptions: (i) zero product substitutability, or
(ii) symmetrical suppliers. Third, the relation between product substitutability and trade credit
provision was developed under the assumption of symmetrical suppliers.
To verify that our results remain valid absent these assumptions, we solve our model numerically
for realistic (calibrated) parameter values. Because our calibration is based on annual sales and
annual interest payments, we set t = 1 year. In addition to serving as a robustness check, the
calibration exercise allows us to quantify the economic significance of our results. Finally, using
simulated data enables examining the effects of the distribution of supplier shares and product
substitutability on trade credit provision in isolation from all other factors associated with firms’
real–life trade credit choices – a feat difficult to accomplish using real data.
4.1. Data
Our main data source, which we use for both the calibration and empirical tests, is Compustat
Annual Industrial Files. To identify customer–supplier links, we use the data of Cohen and Frazzini
(2008), extended to 2009. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) establish customer–supplier relations using
the Compustat Industry Segment data set, which identifies firms’ principal customers. As our focus
is on the strategic considerations in firms’ trade credit choices, we require a customer to be listed
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as such by at least two suppliers. As our theoretical model features customers that are retailers, we
impose a restriction that a customer is a retailer, i.e., it belongs to NAICS industries 44–45 (retail
trade).
To estimate the degree of substitutability among suppliers’ products, we rely on Hoberg and
Phillips’ (2010, 2016) measure of textual similarity between firms’ product descriptions in 10K
filings for each pair of Compustat firms in years 1996–2013. A similarity of zero means that there
are no overlapping words in the two firms’ product descriptions, other than designated “common
words.” A similarity of one means that the two firms’ product descriptions are identical bar these
common words. Importantly, this measure is purged of vertical relations using the Bureau of
Economic Analysis input–output tables.5 As a result of merging the data of Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) with those of Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), our main sample covers years 1996 to 2009.
Our samples of retailers having at least two suppliers and of suppliers listing at least one retailer
as their principle customer contain 571 retailer–years and 2,781 supplier–years, respectively.
4.2. Calibrating interest rates
We begin by calibrating the interest rate parameters, θR, θSi, and θT , using Compustat data,
with the objective of matching the mean interest rates paid by retailers and suppliers to external
financiers and the mean trade credit interest rates to those observed in the data. As follows from
(2), the interest rate paid by a retailer to the bank per unit of time equals θR times the retailer’s
book leverage, defined as the ratio of bank credit,
∑N
i=1 (wixi − Ti) , and the book value (purchase
price) of inventories,
∑N
i=1wixi. We set t = 1 year and calibrate θR as the ratio of the retailer’s
average annual interest rate to its book leverage. We measure a retailer’s average annual interest
rate as the ratio of interest expense, Compustat item xint, to the sum of long-term debt, item
dltt, and short-term debt, item dlc. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of items dltt
and dlc to total book assets, item at. Although it is possible to calibrate θR for each retailer
with the available data, we calibrate a single θR to match the sample mean of the ratio of annual
5We are grateful to Jerry Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for providing us with the complete matrix of firms’ pairwise
similarities, without imposing the lower bound on the similarities.
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interest rate to leverage, which equals 0.324. The reason is that we want to eliminate variation in
all factors other than the distribution of supplier shares and product substitutability that could
affect the equilibrium amount of trade credit financing, interest rates in particular.
Similarly, it follows from (6) that θs can be calibrated as the ratio of a supplier’s average annual
interest rate and its book leverage, defined as the ratio of bank financing, cixi − wixi + Ti, to the
supplier’s book value (production cost) of inventories, cixi. Thus, we calibrate θs to the sample
mean ratio of a supplier’s annual interest rate to its book leverage, which is 0.297.
As trade credit terms are unobservable in our data, we rely on estimates from past studies when
calibrating trade credit interest rate, rT . In particular, Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011)
report mean annualized trade credit interest rate of 28%, which is what we use in our exercise.6
4.3. Construction of the simulated data set
For the 571 retailer–level observations, we obtain the following values from the data:
(i) the number of suppliers that list the retailer as their principal customer;
(ii) revenues of each of the suppliers, Compustat item sale;
(iii) text–based measure of product description similarity among all pairs of the retailer’s suppliers,
computed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), which we denote by γi,i′ for the pair of suppliers i
and i′.
As our data do not have detailed information on sales of each supplier to each retailer, we
approximate supplier i’s share of retailer j’s purchases by the ratio of supplier i’s revenue to the
total revenue of all suppliers of retailer j, SHi =
SALEi∑Nj
k=1 SALEk
, where Nj is the number of firms that
list retailer j as their principal customer. We also compute the HHI of supplier shares for retailer
j as HHIj =
∑Nj
i=1 SH
2
i(∑Nj
i=1 SHi
)2 . As our model assumes that the degree of product substitutability is the
same for all suppliers to a given retailer, we measure retailer–level degree of product substitutability
as the average product description similarity across all supplier pairs of a given retailer, γj =
6Although the two-part contract that is most common in the United States, “2-10 net 30,” corresponds to 43.5%
annualized interest rate, a large proportion of trade credit contracts involves no early payment discount, which brings
the average interest rate to a much lower value (see, e.g., Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011). Our results are
robust to using various values of rT ranging from 10% to 40%.
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∑Nj
i=1
∑Nj
i′=1,i′ 6=i γi,i′
Nj (Nj − 1) .
Next, we choose model parameters so as to match, for each retailer–level observation j, the
following quantities and their empirical counterparts:
(i) the number of suppliers, Nj ;
(ii) the mean pairwise substitutability of the suppliers’ products, γj ;
(iii) the equilibrium HHI of supplier shares, HHI∗j ;
(iv) the mean profit margin of the suppliers,
∑Nj
i=1
(
w∗i
ci
−1
)
Nj
; the profit margin in the data is defined
as the ratio of operating income after depreciation, Compustat item oiadp, to sales, item sale;
the mean supplier profit margin equals 0.093.
The number of suppliers, Nj , and their product substitutability, γj , are deep parameters of the
model, whereas the Herfindahl index, HHI∗j , and the mean supplier profit margin,
∑Nj
i=1
(
w∗i
ci
−1
)
Nj
,
are determined in equilibrium. To match these quantities, we vary the following model parameters:
(i) intercepts of consumer demand for suppliers’ products, αi for supplier i;
(ii) supplier profitability, m = αi/ci, which is identical for all suppliers of a given retailer in the
model as well as in the calibration.
The numerical procedure we use to find these parameters is described in detail in Appendix B.
In addition to Nj , γj , and HHI
∗
j , we record the equilibrium proportion of sales of each supplier
financed by trade credit,
T ∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
for supplier i, and the equilibrium proportion of purchases of retailer
j financed by trade credit,
∑Nj
i=1 T
∗
i∑Nj
i=1 w
∗
i x
∗
i
. Panels A and B of Table 1 report summary statistics of the
simulated samples of suppliers and retailers, respectively.
Inset Table 1 here
Each of the two panels of Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, and number of observa-
tions for the full sample of retailers and for two subsamples: retailers with relatively concentrated
suppliers (five or fewer) and retailers with relatively dispersed suppliers (six or more).
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As can be seen in Panel A, the mean equilibrium supplier share in the full sample is 0.211 with
a standard deviation of 0.326. The mean supplier share is higher in the subsample of retailers
with concentrated suppliers, 0.344, and lower in the subsample of retailers with dispersed suppliers,
0.142. The mean measure of product substitutability in the full sample is 0.0081 with a standard
deviation of 0.018, and it is similar in the two subsamples.
The mean ratio of suppliers’ trade credit to sales is 0.488 with a standard deviation of 0.032.
These statistics are very different from their empirical counterparts: the mean ratio of accounts
receivable, Compustat item rect, to sales, item sale, is 0.159 with a standard deviation of 0.117
(see Table 3 below). These differences are not surprising, as our model abstracts from factors
associated with trade credit choices other than strategic interactions among suppliers. Importantly,
these differences do not prevent us from analyzing the quantitative effects of the supplier share
distribution and product substitutability on equilibrium trade credit provision while shutting off
all other factors related to trade credit.
As shown in Panel B, the mean HHI of supplier shares in the full sample is 0.317 and its standard
deviation is 0.299, indicating that there is substantial variation in the HHI of supplier shares. The
mean HHI is higher within the sample of retailers with more concentrated suppliers and lower
within the sample of retailers with more dispersed suppliers. By construction, the distribution of
simulated HHI of supplier shares matches perfectly the distribution in the data. The distributions
of product substitutability and trade credit ratio are similar to the corresponding distributions in
the supplier sample.
4.4. Estimation with simulated data
We begin by examining the relation between the proportion of supplier i’s sales financed by
trade credit, TC∗i , on the one hand, and supplier share, SH
∗
i , and product substitutability among
suppliers selling to retailer j, γj , on the other. To that end, we estimate the following regression:
TC∗i = α+ β1SH
∗
i + β2γj + i. (24)
23
We estimate (24) for the full sample of retailers, as well as for the subsamples of retailers with rela-
tively concentrated and relatively dispersed suppliers. The results of estimating (24) are presented
in Panel A of Table 2.
Insert Table 2 here
Our analysis in Section 3 predicts a positive β1 and a negative β2. This prediction is borne
out in the simulated data. The coefficient on SH∗i is positive, whereas the coefficient on γj is
negative in the full sample as well as both subsamples. Both coefficients are highly statistically
significant in all instances, as follows from the t–statistics reported in parentheses underneath the
coefficient estimates. This indicates that the model’s qualitative predictions, which we derived
under restrictive assumptions in Section 3, continue to hold for typical values of model parameters.
The calibration also allows us to assess the economic significance of the relations predicted
by the model. A coefficient’s economic significance, reported in curly brackets underneath the
t–statistic, is computed as the coefficient estimate multiplied by the in–sample standard deviation
of the independent variable and divided by the in–sample standard deviation of the dependent
variable. The overall standard deviation of trade credit provided by suppliers is relatively low
because the variation in suppliers’ trade credit in the simulated data is solely due to the free rider
and strategic effects. Nevertheless, the economic significance of the effects of supplier shares and
product substitutability on equilibrium trade credit is quite large.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, a one–standard–deviation increase in a supplier’s share of the
retailer’s purchases is associated with a 44% (59%, 25%) standard–deviation increase in the sup-
plier’s trade credit–to–sales ratio in the full sample (subsample of concentrated suppliers, subsample
of dispersed suppliers). A one–standard–deviation increase in product substitutability is associated
with 109% (93%, 110%) standard–deviation decrease in the supplier’s trade credit–to–sales ratio
in the full sample (subsample of concentrated suppliers, subsample of dispersed suppliers).
To estimate the relation between the proportion of retailer j’s purchases financed by trade
credit, TC∗j , on the one hand, and the Herfindahl index of retailer j’s supplier shares, HHI
∗
j ,
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and product substitutability among retailer j’s suppliers, γj , on the other hand, we estimate the
following regression:
TC∗j = α+ β1HHI
∗
j + β2γj + j . (25)
The results of estimating (25) are presented in Panel B of Table 2. Consistent with our theory, the
coefficient β1 is positive whereas the coefficient β2 is negative.
The economic significance of both of these effects is also large. A one–standard–deviation
increase in the HHI of supplier shares is associated with a 26–49% standard–deviation increase
in the retailer’s ratio of trade credit to cost of goods sold. A one–standard–deviation increase
in substitutability among suppliers’ products is associated with a 93%–126% standard–deviation
decrease in the retailer’s ratio of trade credit to cost of goods sold.
Overall, the results of calibrating the model and estimating the equilibrium relations within
simulated data indicate that the analytical relations derived in Section 3 do not hinge on the
parametric assumptions that we had to adopt for tractability. Equally important, the effects of the
distribution of supplier shares and product substitutability on the equilibrium trade credit provision
are economically significant.
5. Empirical predictions and discussion
Our model assumes, for ease of exposition, one retailer. Extending the logic to multiple retailers,
Propositions 1 and 1a suggest that equilibrium trade credit provided by a supplier to each of its
retailers is increasing in the supplier’s share of the retailer’s purchases. This leads to our first
prediction.
Prediction 1 The ratio of trade credit provided by a supplier to its sales is positively related to the
supplier’s average share of its retailers’ purchases.
We are not aware of any existing theories that yield this prediction. Petersen and Rajan (1997)
argue that when a customer’s survival depends on obtaining trade credit, a monopolistic supplier,
which is more likely to internalize the long-term benefit of helping the customer, should be willing
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to provide more trade credit. This argument is based on the supplier’s competitive position vis-a`-vis
all firms in its industry – whether they sell to the same customers or not. In contrast, we emphasize
the importance of the supplier’s position among all firms selling to the same customers – regardless
of their industry affiliations. Consider the following example that highlights the distinction. Our
model predicts that a retailer buying from multiple monopolistic suppliers obtains less trade credit
than a retailer purchasing from a single competitive supplier, whereas Petersen and Rajan’s (1997)
theory predicts the opposite.
The remaining trade credit theories that consider supplier competition predict the relation
between trade credit provision and supplier market power to be negative. Fisman and Raturi (2004)
argue that a customer of a monopolistic supplier does not have incentives to invest in establishing
creditworthiness with this supplier due to potential hold-up, which makes the supplier reluctant to
offer trade credit. Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2015) predict a negative relation between trade credit
provision and supplier bargaining power in the context of relationship–specific investments. Fabbri
and Klapper (2016) argue that more powerful suppliers are in a better position to require cash
payments. Although the predictions and empirical findings of the three aforementioned papers
may seem in contrast with our Prediction 1, they all emphasize a supplier’s market power, whereas
our focus is on a supplier’s share of its customers’ purchases.
Our second empirical prediction is based on Propositions 2 and 2a.
Prediction 2 The ratio of trade credit received by a retailer to the cost of its purchases is positively
related to the Herfindahl index of supplier shares of the retailer’s purchases.
The existing studies that we are aware of connecting trade credit provision to supplier concen-
tration are Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2015) and Fabbri and Klapper (2016). Both these papers argue
that more powerful suppliers have a lesser need to provide trade credit, and a supplier’s power
increases with the concentration of its industry. Once again, this prediction and the evidence in its
support are only seemingly in contrast with ours. We focus on the concentration of selling shares of
all suppliers that sell to a given retailer, even if they operate in different industries, whereas Dass,
Kale, and Nanda (2015) and Fabbri and Klapper (2016) focus on the concentration of suppliers
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that belong to the same industry and may or may not sell to the same customers.
Our next two empirical predictions follow from Proposition 3.
Prediction 3a The ratio of trade credit provided by a supplier to its sales is negatively related to
the average product substitutability among suppliers selling to the same retailers.
Prediction 3b The ratio of trade credit received by a retailer to the cost of its purchases is negatively
related to the average product substitutability among suppliers selling to that retailer.
There are several theories that predict a positive relation between product differentiation in
supplier industry and trade credit provision. According to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), differ-
entiated goods are more difficult to divert for private benefits by an opportunistic buyer, which
makes suppliers of differentiated goods more willing to sell on credit. Cun˜at (2007) argues that
differentiated goods tend to be more buyer–specific, leading to higher switching costs for the buyer.
As a result, a buyer of differentiated goods is less tempted to strategically default, which increases
suppliers’ willingness to offer trade credit. Chod, Trichakis, and Tsoukalas (2017) suggest that the
generally lower liquidity of differentiated goods makes borrowing in kind more effective in signaling
borrower’s quality. Consistent with these predictions, the empirical relation between trade credit
and product differentiation in supplier industry has been found positive (see, e.g., McMillan and
Woodruff, 1999; Cun˜at, 2007; Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011; Dass, Kale, and Nanda,
2015).
Although our predictions regarding trade credit provision and product substitutability may
appear similar to those of Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cun˜at (2007), and Chod, Trichakis, and
Tsoukalas (2017), they are fundamentally distinct from all of them. These theories tie the advantage
of trade credit financing to the inherent nature of the transacted good, namely, its differentiation
from all other goods in the supplier’s industry. In contrast, our theory has to do with the relations
among suppliers to a particular retailer, i.e., we relate trade credit to product substitutability
among suppliers of a given retailer. This distinction is best illustrated by the following example.
Suppose that a firm sources several commodity–like but mutually non–substitutable inputs, each
from a different supplier. Given the commodity–like nature of the inputs, all of the aforementioned
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theories would predict little trade credit financing. Given that the inputs are not mutual substitutes,
our theory predicts the opposite.
6. Empirical tests
6.1. Empirical specifications
We examine the model’s predictions empirically employing the same data of 571 retailer–years
and 2,781 supplier–years that we use to calibrate the model. While our model is best suited to de-
scribe trade credit provided by suppliers to retailers, i.e., firms that resell suppliers’ products to end
consumers, we also test the model’s predictions using alternative samples of corporate customers:
(i) wholesalers, (ii) customers that are neither retailers nor wholesalers, and (iii) all corporate cus-
tomers. The results for these alternative samples, reported in Table A6 in the Online Appendix, are
generally weaker than those for the sample of retailers, but tend to remain statistically significant.
In addition, as we discussed in Section 3.4, our predictions are only relevant for the case in which
the retailer’s cost of bank credit and, thus, its demand for trade credit are high, resulting in trade
credit being strategically rationed by suppliers. Therefore, we also test the model’s predictions
within a subsample of retailers paying relatively high (above median) interest rates on non-trade-
credit debt. Consistent with our theory, we find that the empirical relations between supplier share
concentration and supplier product substitutability on the one hand, and retailers’ trade credit on
the other, are indeed stronger within the high-interest-rate subsample. These robustness results
are available in Table A7 in the Online Appendix.
According to Prediction 1, trade credit provided by a supplier is positively related to the
supplier’s average share of retailers’ purchases. Prediction 3a states that a supplier’s trade credit is
negatively related to the substitutability of its products with those of suppliers selling to the same
retailers. We test these predictions by estimating a regression of supplier i’s trade credit, TCi, on
proxies for the supplier’s average share of its retailers’ purchases, SHi, and for the average product
substitutability between the supplier and other suppliers selling to the same retailers, γi, while
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controlling for variables that have been found in past studies to be associated with trade credit,
and which we denote by the vector Ωi:
TCi = α+ β1SHi + β2γi + β
′
cΩi + i. (26)
According to Prediction 2, trade credit obtained by a retailer is positively related to the Herfind-
ahl index of supplier shares of the retailer’s purchases. Prediction 3b states that a retailer’s trade
credit is negatively related to the average product substitutability among its suppliers. We test
these predictions by estimating a regression of trade credit obtained by retailer j, TCj , on proxies
for the retailer’s Herfindahl index of supplier shares, HHIj , and for the average substitutability
among products of suppliers selling to the retailer, γj , while controlling for other variables related
to retailers’ trade credit, Ωj :
TCj = α+ β1HHIj + β2γj + β
′
cΩj + j . (27)
We estimate the regressions in (26) and (27) with OLS using all supplier–year and retailer–year
observations, respectively, while including year fixed effects and clustering standard errors by firm.
6.2. Variables
6.2.1. Suppliers
Dependent variable. Following past studies (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011), we define trade credit extended by supplier i, TCi, as the ratio of
supplier i’s accounts receivable, Compustat item RECT, and sales, item SALE. The ratio of trade
credit to sales, as all other ratios, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Main independent variables. In constructing the main independent variables, we need to
account for the fact that any given supplier may sell to multiple retailers and face a different set
of competitors in each instance. For every retailer in the sample, we identify suppliers that list
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that retailer as their principal customer. Then, for each supplier in this set, we record all retailers
to which the supplier sells and all other suppliers selling to each of these retailers. We then test
whether trade credit extended by supplier i is (i) positively related to supplier i’s average share
of purchases by all retailers to which supplier i sells, and (ii) negatively related to the average
substitutability between products of supplier i and products of all other suppliers that sell to the
same retailers as supplier i.
Note that this approach restricts our analysis to retailer–supplier pairs. In reality, however,
suppliers may also sell to corporate customers that are not retailers. Relations with these customers
may also influence the amount of trade credit that a supplier extends. Thus, we also examine
robustness of our results within stricter samples in which retailers are responsible for at least 25%,
50%, or 100% of suppliers’ sales. The results for these alternative samples are presented in Table
A3 in the Online Appendix. Since we do not have information regarding sales of each supplier
to each customer, we assume that a supplier’s sales to each of its customers are proportional to
that customer’s overall purchases, measured by its cost of goods sold. The results based on these
subsamples are similar to those based on the full sample of all suppliers.
Average supplier share. Absent information regarding sales of each supplier to each retailer, we
proxy for supplier i’s share of retailer j’s purchases, SHi,j , by the total sales of supplier i over the
total sales of all Nj suppliers selling to retailer j, i.e., SHi,j =
SALESi∑Nj
k=1 SALESk
. To obtain supplier i’s
average share of retailers’ purchases, we average these shares over all Mi retailers to which supplier
i sells:
SHi =
∑Mi
j=1 SHi,j
Mi
. (28)
Our results are also robust to using retailer–purchases–weighted average supplier share: SHi =∑Mi
j=1 SHi,jCOGSj∑Mi
j=1 COGSj
, where COGSj is the cost of goods sold by retailer j. The results for alternative
specifications of independent variables are available in Table A2 in the Online Appendix.
Average product substitutability. As discussed in Section 4, we measure product substitutability
between two suppliers by textual similarity of their product descriptions in 10K filings, provided by
30
Jerry Hoberg and Gordon Phillips. We compute average product substitutability between supplier
i and other suppliers selling to the same retailers in two steps. First, we compute the average
substitutability between products of supplier i and products of the other Nj −1 suppliers selling to
retailer j as γi,j =
∑Nj
i′=1,i′ 6=i γi,i′
Nj − 1 , where γi,i
′ is the textual similarity between product descriptions
of suppliers i and i′, both of which sell to retailer j. We then compute the mean of the average
substitutabilities across all Mi retailers to which supplier i sells:
γi =
∑Mi
j=1 γi,j
Mi
. (29)
Our results are also robust to using retailer–purchases–weighted mean substitutability, computed
as γi =
∑Mi
j=1 γi,jCOGSj∑Mi
j=1 COGSj
.
Control variables. Trade credit extended by suppliers to their customers may be related to
the following factors.
Suppliers’ financing advantage over banks, which is expected to be greater for suppliers of
differentiated goods (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002;
Cu˜nat, 2007; Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011) and suppliers of services (e.g., Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011). To control for the nature of transacted goods, we follow Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) and include two indicator variables: a dummy equaling one if a
supplier sells differentiated products and a dummy equaling one if it sells services, both based on
industry classification of Rauch (1999).
Suppliers’ financial constraints, which we measure by the Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) size–
age index (see, e.g., Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi, 2013; Dass, Kale, and Nanda, 2015).7
Suppliers’ access to external financing also depends on their credit ratings, which we measure using
7Given potential non–linearities in the relation between this index and trade credit, we use two dummy variables: a
constrained dummy equaling one if the value of the supplier’s Hadlock-Pierce index belongs to the top three deciles of
the index’s distribution in the given year, and an unconstrained dummy equaling one if the value of the index belongs
to the bottom three deciles. The coefficients on the main independent variables are similar if the dummies are based
on the Hadlock-Pierce index being above or below median as in Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012), if we
use the individual index components (size and age) as in Petersen and Rajan (1997), or if we use the index itself.
We perform similar robustness tests when examining trade credit obtained by retailers and find that the results for
retailers are also robust to these changes in variable definitions.
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a dummy variable equaling one if the supplier has an investment–grade credit rating, defined as
BBB– or above (see, e.g., Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010).8 In
addition, a supplier’s ability to extend trade credit may depend on its liquidity and its leverage.
We measure liquidity by the ratio of cash and marketable securities, Compustat item CHE, to book
assets, item AT. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of short–term and long–term debt,
items DLC and DLTT, respectively, to the sum of short–term debt, long–term debt, and market value
of equity, computed as the product of shares outstanding and the end–of–year price per share, items
CSHO and PRCC C, respectively.
Suppliers’ incentives to price discriminate, which are increasing in supplier profitability, proxied
by the ratio of operating income after depreciation, item OIADP, to sales, item SALE (e.g., Petersen
and Rajan, 1997).
Suppliers’ growth, which we measure as the ratio of sales, item SALE, to its lagged value minus
one (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
Suppliers’ relationship–specific investments, which we proxy by R&D expenditures, item XRD,
and advertising expenditures, item XAD, both normalized by book assets, as in Dass, Kale, and
Nanda (2015).
Suppliers’ market power, which reduces the need to use trade credit as an incentive device (see,
e.g., Dass, Kale, and Nanda, 2015; Fabbri and Klapper, 2016). We use two measures of supplier
market power: the ratio of a supplier’s sales to the total sales in its 3–digit SIC industry, and the
Herfindahl index of sales in the supplier’s 3–digit SIC industry.
6.2.2. Retailers
Dependent variable. Following Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), we measure trade
credit received by retailer j, TCj , as the ratio of the retailer’s accounts payable, Compustat item
AP, and the cost of goods sold, item COGS.
8Our results are robust to using a dummy variable equaling one if the supplier has any credit rating instead of an
investment–grade rating. A similar statement holds for the retailer regressions.
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Main independent variables. We test whether trade credit received by retailer j is (i) posi-
tively related to the Herfindahl index of supplier shares of retailer j’s purchases, and (ii) negatively
related to the average substitutability among products of all suppliers selling to retailer j.
Herfindahl index of supplier shares. Recall our proxy for supplier i’s share of retailer j’s pur-
chases, SHi,j =
SALESi∑Nj
k=1 SALESk
, where Nj is the number of suppliers selling to retailer j. The
Herfindahl index of supplier shares for retailer j is then computed as:
HHIj =
∑Nj
i=1 SH
2
i,j(∑Nj
i=1 SHi,j
)2 . (30)
Average product substitutability. In our model, product substitutability is the same across all
pairs of suppliers to a given retailer. Since this is not the case in the data, we compute the average
product substitutability among the Nj suppliers selling to retailer j as
γj =
∑Nj
i=1
∑Nj
i′=1,i′ 6=i γi,i′
Nj(Nj − 1) , (31)
where γi,i′ is the textual similarity between product descriptions of suppliers i and i
′, both of
which sell to retailer j. Our results are robust to using supplier–sales–weighted average product
substitutability, defined as γj =
∑Nj
i=1
∑Nj
i′=i,i′ 6=i γi,i′ (SALESi+SALESi′ )∑Nj
i=1
∑Nj
i′=i,i′ 6=i (SALESi+SALESi′ )
. The results for alternative
specifications of independent variables are available in Table A5 in the Online Appendix.
Control variables. Trade credit received by retailers may be related to the following factors.
Advantages of trade credit over bank credit, which are expected to be greater for retailers pur-
chasing a larger share of differentiated inputs and a lower share of service inputs (e.g., Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011), and those holding a lower share of finished goods inventories (e.g.,
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). To control for the nature of transacted goods, we use Rauch’s (1999)
industry–wide estimates of proportions of differentiated and service inputs. To control for the pro-
portion of inventories of finished goods out of total inventories, we compute the ratio of Compustat
item INVFG and item INVT.
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Retailers’ financial constraints, which we measure using the Hadlock-Pierce index and credit
rating. Because retailers’ access to external financing could be related to their tangible assets,
which are easier to collateralize, we also control for asset tangibility, defined as the ratio of physical
capital stock over book assets, item AT. To measure a firm’s stock of physical capital, we adopt a
variant of perpetual inventory method.9 In addition, retailers’ access to external financing could
be related to their liquidity and leverage, measured similarly to those of suppliers.
Retailers’ growth, which we measure similarly to that of suppliers.
Retailers’ market power, which could allow them to obtain more trade credit (e.g., Wilner,
2000), and which we proxy by the retailer’s market share in its 3–digit SIC industry as well as by
the Herfindahl index of the retailer’s 3–digit SIC industry.
6.3. Summary statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3, which contains two panels. Panel A reports
statistics for 2,781 supplier–years. Panel B presents statistics for 571 retailer–years.
Insert Table 3 here
The mean ratio of trade credit extended by suppliers to their sales is 0.16, whereas the mean ratio
of trade credit received by retailers to their cost of goods sold is higher – 0.23. This is consistent
with Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), who report that retailers tend to obtain more trade
credit than other corporate customers.
The mean supplier share of retailers’ purchases is slightly over 20%, consistent with roughly
9First, we calculate the 3–digit SIC industry–average depreciation rate of physical capital for each year, where a
firm’s depreciation rate is the ratio of its accounting depreciation, item DP, and its beginning–of–year gross PP&E,
item PPEGT. Second, we compute the firm’s stock of physical capital in the following way. A firm’s capital stock at
the end of year 1, which is defined as the first year the firm appears in Compustat, is its gross PP&E depreciated
with the industry–wide depreciation rate in year 1. Its capital stock at the end of any year τ > 1 is the sum of the
capital stock in year τ − 1 and the capital investment in year τ , computed as the difference between PPEGT in year
τ and that in year τ − 1, and depreciated with the industry–wide depreciation rate in year τ . A similar method is
frequently used for computing the stock of intangible capital (see, e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Hirshleifer,
Hsu, and Li, 2013) and organization capital (e.g., Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). We obtain similar results if we
use a fixed depreciation rate for all industries and years – 15% as in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), 20% as in
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013), as well as other rates ranging from 10% to 30%.
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five suppliers per retailer in our sample. The mean Herfindahl index of supplier shares is around
30%, indicating relatively high supplier concentration for most retailers. The average product
substitutability among suppliers of a given retailer varies considerably across retailers, with a
standard deviation over twice the mean within the supplier sample and three times the mean
within the sample of retailers.
Retailers in our sample are quite large – their mean assets are roughly 30 times larger than those
of their suppliers, consistent with retailers being typically larger than other corporate customers
and with the bias towards large customers in Cohen and Frazzini’s (2008) data. Retailers also tend
to be much older than their suppliers. Retailers are somewhat more profitable than suppliers and
grow at a slightly higher pace on average. The mean proportion of tangible assets is twice as large
for retailers than for suppliers. Suppliers tend to hold larger liquid assets and tend to be more
financially constrained than retailers, whereas the mean leverage is similar across the two groups.
Suppliers and retailers have similar market shares in their industries, around 25% on average.
The magnitudes of the correlations between the focal independent variables, reported in Tables
A1 and A4 in the Online Appendix, are low: the correlation between the mean supplier share and
the mean substitutability of the supplier’s products is 9% and that between the HHI of supplier
shares and the mean product substitutability among suppliers of a given retailer is -7%.
6.4. Empirical results
6.4.1. Suppliers
We first estimate the regression in (26) to test Prediction 1, i.e., a positive relation between a
supplier’s trade credit and its average share of retailers’ purchases, SHi, and Prediction 3a, i.e., a
negative relation between a supplier’s trade credit and substitutability of its products with products
of other suppliers that sell to the same retailers, γi. The results are presented in Table 4, which
has four columns.
Insert Table 4 here
35
In the first column, the set of independent variables includes only SHi and γi. In column 2, we
augment the regression with all of the control variables defined in Subsection 6.2.1. Despite the
low correlation between SHi and γi, to ensure that inclusion of both does not bias the coefficient
estimates, in columns 3 and 4 we estimate the regression while including only one of these two focal
independent variables at a time, along with control variables.
Consistent with Prediction 1, the coefficient on SHi is positive and significant at 10% level
regardless of the inclusion of the other independent variables. The economic effect of a supplier’s
average share of its retailers’ purchases on trade credit extended by that supplier is not negligible: A
one–standard–deviation increase in SHi is associated with an 8% (9%) standard–deviation increase
in trade credit in the absence (presence) of control variables. The fact that the economic effect
is around five times lower than in the regressions based on simulated data in Section 4, suggests
that managers incorporate strategic considerations into their trade credit decisions only partially,
and/or trade credit and the supplier’s competitive position at the customer level are linked through
other channels that are not captured by our model.
Consistent with Prediction 3a, the coefficient on γi is negative and highly statistically significant
in all specifications. Economically, a one–standard–deviation increase in γi is associated with a 10–
11% standard–deviation reduction in trade credit. Again, the fact that these figures are an order
of magnitude lower than those estimated with simulated data suggests that the relation between
substitutability among suppliers’ products and trade credit that these suppliers extend may have
additional facets that are not captured by our model. A comparison of the coefficients on SHi and
γi in columns 3 and 4 with those in column 1 suggests that neither of our proxies for the main
independent variables substantially alters the relation between trade credit and the proxy for the
other main independent variable.
To further ensure that one of the main independent variables is not capturing the measurement
error of the other, we also augment the regression in (26) by including quadratic and cubic terms
of average product substitutability and average supplier share. The estimates of these augmented
regressions, available in Table A8 in the Online Appendix, show that the coefficients on the linear
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terms and their statistical significance do not change substantially following the inclusion of the
higher order terms. The coefficients on the quadratic terms are either statistically insignificant
or have the same sign as the linear term coefficients. The coefficients on the cubic terms are all
insignificant. These results suggest that neither of the main independent variables is likely to
capture the measurement error of the other.
The coefficients on control variables are generally in line with existing theories and evidence.
Suppliers of differentiated goods and services extend more trade credit than suppliers of standard-
ized goods, consistent with trade credit theories based on borrower opportunism and suppliers’
informational advantage. Financially unconstrained suppliers tend to provide more trade credit.
Trade credit provision is negatively associated with suppliers’ leverage, suggesting that firms closer
to their debt capacity are more constrained in offering credit. Growing suppliers provide more
trade credit, consistent with their increasing sales being partially fueled by trade credit provision.
Advertising is positively associated with trade credit, consistent with the use of trade credit as a
commitment device for relationship–specific investments. The concentration of suppliers’ industries
exhibits a strong negative relation with trade credit, consistent with the supplier market power hy-
pothesis. At the same time, judging from the negative and insignificant coefficients on suppliers’
profit margin, we do not find support for the price discrimination hypothesis.
6.4.2. Retailers
Next, we estimate the regression in (27) to test Prediction 2, i.e., a positive relation between
trade credit received by a retailer and the Herfindahl index of supplier shares of the retailer’s
purchases, HHIj , and Prediction 3b, i.e., a negative relation between trade credit received by a
retailer and the mean product substitutability among the retailer’s suppliers, γj . The results are
presented in Table 5, whose layout is similar to that of Table 4.
Insert Table 5 here
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The association between the concentration of a retailer’s suppliers, HHIj , and the trade credit
that the retailer obtains is positive and highly statistically significant. A one–standard–deviation
increase in HHIj is associated with 9–14% standard–deviation increase in the retailer’s trade credit.
Average product substitutability among a retailer’s suppliers is negatively and significantly related
to the trade credit obtained by the retailer. The economic significance of the coefficient on γj is
consistent with the estimates in Table 4: A one–standard–deviation increase in γj is associated
with 8–16% standard–deviation decrease in the retailer’s trade credit.
Similar to the case of suppliers, removing one of the two main independent variables from the
regression, as well as augmenting the regression by higher-order terms of the main independent
variables does not affect the estimates materially. The results of these augmented regressions are
available in Table A9 in the Online Appendix. As in the case of suppliers’ trade credit regressions,
the coefficients on control variables tend to be consistent with past studies and existing theories.
Trade credit received by a retailer is negatively related to the proportion of finished goods in the
retailer’s inventories, consistent with suppliers having a greater advantage over banks in liquidating
inventories of raw materials. Trade credit is positively related to the proportion of differentiated
inputs, consistent with the moral hazard and information asymmetry theories. Trade credit is
negatively related to the proportion of service inputs, for which suppliers’ advantage in liquidating
repossessed inventory becomes irrelevant. Consistent with the demand for trade credit hypothesis,
financially constrained and highly levered retailers use more trade credit, whereas retailers with
more tangible assets that could be used as collateral for bank credit use less trade credit. Inconsis-
tent with this hypothesis, however, retailers with investment–grade rating, which are likely to have
access to other sources of financing, obtain more trade credit. Retailers with growing sales tend
to rely more on trade credit. Finally, consistent with the market power hypothesis, retailers with
larger market power within their industries receive more trade credit.
Overall, the empirical relations between the distribution of suppliers’ selling shares and substi-
tutability among their products on the one hand, and trade credit provided by suppliers to retailers
on the other, are consistent with the model’s predictions. We interpret these findings as being sug-
38
gestive of suppliers taking into account strategic interactions with other suppliers that sell to the
same customers, when making trade credit decisions.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we examine the effect of competition among suppliers on their willingness to
provide trade credit. Our theory is based on the observation that when a supplier provides trade
credit to a cash constrained retailer, the latter can use the freed–up liquidity to increase cash
purchases from other suppliers. This creates a free rider problem, whereby each supplier providing
trade credit incurs the full cost of doing so, but internalizes only a part of the benefit.
The portion of this benefit that is internalized by the trade creditor increases with the trade
creditor’s share of the retailer’s purchases. As a result, a supplier responsible for a larger share of a
retailer’s purchases is willing to finance a larger portion of its sales to this retailer by trade credit.
For a similar reason, a retailer with more concentrated supplier shares receives more trade credit.
The free rider problem is exacerbated when suppliers sell substitutable products and, therefore,
compete not only for retailers’ cash but also for end consumers. Therefore, the greater the product
substitutability among suppliers selling to a given retailer, the less trade credit they are willing to
provide to this retailer.
We calibrate the model and use simulated data, in which all factors related to trade credit
extraneous to the model are shut off, to show that the relations predicted by the model are eco-
nomically significant. We also provide suggestive empirical evidence indicating that the relations
between the distribution of supplier shares and substitutability among suppliers’ products on the
one hand and trade credit on the other, are consistent with our model, statistically significant, and
economically sizable.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The optimal x∗ (w,T) is given by ∂ΠR (x,T,w) /∂xj = 0 for all j = 1, ...N , where ΠR is given
in Eq. (4). Thus x∗ (w,T) must satisfy
αj − wj − 2
t
xj + γ N∑
i=1,i 6=j
xi
− tθRwj
1−( ∑Ni=1 Ti∑N
i=1wixi
)2 = 0 for j = 1, ..., N. (32)
With N = 1, we can drop the product/supplier index and Eq. (32) becomes
α− w − 2x
t
− tθRw
(
1−
(
T
wx
)2)
= 0, (33)
which directly gives
∂x
∂T
=
t2θR
T
wx2
1 + t2θR
T 2
wx3
(34)
∂x
∂w
= −1 + tθR + tθR
T 2
w2x2
2
t + 2tθR
T 2
wx3
. (35)
As t→ 0, this becomes
1
t
∂x
∂T
→ tθR T
wx2
, (36)
1
t
∂x
∂w
→ −1
2
. (37)
The supplier’s payoff (56) is
ΠS = (w − c)x+ tθTT − tθS (cx− wx+ T )
2
cx
, (38)
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and the optimality conditions for w∗ and T ∗ are
dΠS
dT
= tθT − 2tθS (cx− wx+ T )
cx
+
∂x
∂T
(
(w − c)− tθSc(cx− wx)
2 − T 2
(cx)2
)
= 0, (39)
dΠS
dw
= x+ 2tθS
(cx− wx+ T )x
cx
+
∂x
∂w
(
(w − c)− tθSc(cx− wx)
2 − T 2
(cx)2
)
= 0. (40)
As t→ 0, this becomes
θT − 2θS (cx− wx+ T )
cx
+
1
t
∂x
∂T
(w − c) = 0, (41)
x
t
+
1
t
∂x
∂w
(w − c) = 0. (42)
Finally, as t→ 0, Eq. (33) becomes
x
t
=
α− w
2
. (43)
Combining Eq. (36)-(43) gives the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1
The retailer’s optimality conditions (32) can be written as
αj − wj − 2
t
(
(1− γ)xj + γ
N∑
i=1
xi
)
− tθRwj
1−

N∑
i=1
Ti
N∑
i=1
wixi

2 = 0 for j = 1, ..., N. (44)
Taking the total derivative of (44) w.r.t. Tk gives
− 2
t
(1− γ) ∂xj
∂Tk
− 2
t
γ
N∑
i=1
∂xi
∂Tk
+ 2tθRwj
N∑
i=1
Ti
N∑
i=1
wixi
N∑
i=1
wixi −
N∑
i=1
Ti
N∑
i=1
wi
∂xi
∂Tk(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)2 = 0 (45)
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for j = 1, ..., N. Taking the total derivative of (44) w.r.t. wk gives
1 +
2
t
(
(1− γ) ∂xk
∂wk
+ γ
N∑
i=1
∂xi
∂wk
)
+ tθR − tθR
(
N∑
i=1
Ti
)2
(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)2 + 2tθRwk
(
N∑
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Ti
)2(
xk +
N∑
i=1
wi
∂xi
∂wk
)
(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)3 = 0,
(46)
and
2
t
(
(1− γ) ∂xj
∂wk
+ γ
N∑
i=1
∂xi
∂wk
)
+ 2tθRwj
(
N∑
i=1
Ti
)2(
xk +
N∑
i=1
wi
∂xi
∂wk
)
(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)3 = 0 (47)
for k = j and k 6= j, respectively.
As t→ 0, conditions (44) simplify into
αj − wj − 2
t
(
(1− γ)xj + γ
N∑
i=1
xi
)
= 0 for all j. (48)
As t→ 0, conditions (45) simplify into
(1− γ) 1
t
∂xj
∂Tk
+ γ
N∑
i=1
1
t
∂xi
∂Tk
− tθRwj
N∑
i=1
Ti(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)2 = 0 for all j and k. (49)
As t→ 0, conditions (46) and (47) simplify into
1
2
+ (1− γ) 1
t
∂xk
∂wk
+ γ
N∑
i=1
1
t
∂xi
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= 0 for all k, and (50)
(1− γ) 1
t
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1
t
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= 0 for all j and k 6= j. (51)
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Summing Eq. (49) over all j’s, we obtain
N∑
i=1
1
t
∂xi
∂Tk
= tθR
N∑
i=1
Ti
N∑
i=1
wi
(1− γ + γN)
(
N∑
i=1
wixi
)2 . (52)
Combining (49) and (52) gives
1
t
∂xk
∂Tk
= t
θR
1− γ
(
wk − γ
∑N
i=1wi
(1− γ + γN)
) ∑N
i=1 Ti(∑N
i=1wixi
)2 for all k. (53)
Summing equations (50) and (51) over all j’s, we obtain
∑N
i=1
1
t
∂xi
∂wk
= −1
2
1
1− γ +Nγ . (54)
Combining (51) and (54) gives
1
t
∂xk
∂wk
=
1
2 (1− γ)
(
γ
1− γ +Nγ − 1
)
for all k. (55)
The objective of supplier k can be written as
ΠSk = (wk − ck)x∗k + rTTk − tθS
(ckx
∗
k − wkx∗k + Tk)2
ckx
∗
k
, (56)
and the optimality conditions for w∗k and T
∗
k are
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dTk
=
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+
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= 0, and (57)
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Taking the derivatives, conditions (57) and (58) become
dΠSk
dTk
= −2tθS (ckxk − wkxk + Tk)
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As t→ 0, conditions (59) and (60) simplify into
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where 1t
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∂Tk
and 1t
∂xk
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are given by (53) and (55), respectively. Using Eq. (61), we obtain
Tk
wkxk
→ 2θS (wk − ck) + θT ck +
1
t
∂xk
∂Tk
(wk − ck) ck
2θSwk
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Combining (48), (55), and (62) gives us
wk →
(
m+ 1− γ1−γ+Nγ
)
ck − 2γ 1t
N∑
i=1
xi
2− γ1−γ+Nγ
. (64)
Now suppose that γ = 0. Using Eq. (53), (63), (48), and (64), as t → 0, we have 1txk → m−14 ck,
wk → m+12 ck, and
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θR
2θS
1
t
∑N
i=1 Ti(∑N
i=1wixi
)2 (wkxk)2 4m+ 1 . (66)
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Summing Eq. (66) over k = 1, ..., N , we get
1
t
∑N
k=1
Tk →
(
m− 1
m+ 1
+
θT
θS
1
m+ 1
)
1
t
∑N
k=1
wkxk +
2
m+ 1
θR
θS
HHI
1
t
∑N
k=1
Tk =⇒ (67)
1
t
∑N
k=1
Tk →
(
m−1
m+1 +
θT
θS
1
m+1
)
(
1− 2m+1 θRθSHHI
) 1
t
∑N
k=1
wkxk. (68)
Combining Eq. (68) and Eq. (65) yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose γ = 0. It follows from Eq. (48) and Eq. (64) that as t → 0, we have 1txk → m−14 ck
and wk → m+12 ck for all k = 1, ..., N . It also follows from Eq. (53) and Eq. (63) that
1
t
Tk → 1
t
(wk − ck)xk + 1
t
θT
2θS
ckxk +
θR
2θS
wk
∑N
i=1 Ti(∑N
i=1wixi
)2 (wk − ck) ckxk. (69)
Summing Eq. (69) over all k’s gives
1
t
N∑
k=1
Tk → 1
t
N∑
k=1
(wk − ck)xk + 1
t
θT
2θS
N∑
k=1
ckxk +
θR
2θS
∑N
i=1 Ti(∑N
i=1wixi
)2 N∑
k=1
wk (wk − ck) ckxk. (70)
Therefore,
∑N
k=1 Tk∑N
k=1wkxk
→
θS
N∑
k=1
(wk−ck)xk∑N
k=1 wkxk
+ θT2
N∑
k=1
ckxk∑N
k=1 wkxk
θS − t θR2
N∑
k=1
wk(wk−ck)ckxk
(
∑N
k=1 wkxk)
2
. (71)
Substituting for 1txk =
m−1
4 ck and wk =
m+1
2 ck gives the desired result.
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Proof of Proposition 1a
Suppose t→ 0 and αk > αl. It follows from Eq. (63) that Tkwkxk >
Tl
wlxl
if and only if
2θS (wk − ck) + θT ck + 1t ∂xk∂Tk (wk − ck) ck
2θSwk
>
2θS (wl − cl) + θT cl + 1t ∂xl∂Tl (wl − cl) cl
2θSwl
(72)
⇐⇒ (2θS − θT ) wk
ck
+
1
t
∂xk
∂Tk
(wk − ck) wl
cl
> (2θS − θT ) wl
cl
+
1
t
∂xl
∂Tl
(wl − cl) wk
ck
. (73)
Given that 2θS > θT , which follows from Eq. (10), it is enough to show that
wk
ck
> wlcl and
1
t
∂xk
∂Tk
(wk − ck) wlcl > 1t
∂xl
∂Tl
(wl − cl) wkck . The first inequality follows directly from Eq. (64). The
second inequality can be rewritten using (53) as
(
1− 1
wk
γ
∑N
i=1wi
(1− γ + γN)
)
(wk − ck) ck >
(
1− 1
wl
γ
∑N
i=1wi
(1− γ + γN)
)
(wl − cl) cl. (74)
This last inequality follows from the fact that ck > cl and Eq. (64). Thus, we have shown that
αk > αl ⇐⇒ T
∗
k
w∗kx
∗
k
>
T ∗l
w∗l x
∗
l
, and it remains to show that αk > αl ⇐⇒ w∗kx∗k > w∗l x∗l . It follows
directly from Eq. (64) that αk > αl ⇐⇒ w∗k > w∗l . Combining Eq. (64) and Eq. (48) yields
1
t
xk → 1
2 (1− γ)
(
ck (m− 1)− 1
t
2γ
N∑
i=1
xi
)
1− γ1−γ+Nγ
2− γ1−γ+Nγ
. (75)
Thus, αk > αl ⇐⇒ x∗k > x∗l , which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2a
When suppliers are symmetrical, the share of each decreases in the total number of suppliers.
Thus, we need to prove ddN
T ∗
w∗x∗ < 0. It follows from Eq. (48) and (64) that as t→ 0,
w → α (1− γ) + c (1− 2γ + γN)
2− 3γ + γN , and (76)
1
t
x → 1
2
(α− c) (1− 2γ +Nγ)
(2− 3γ + γN) (1− γ + γN) . (77)
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It further follows from Eq. (53) and (63) that
T
wx
→ θS (w − c) +
θT
2 c
θSw − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN)
. (78)
We have ddN
T
wx =
∂
∂N
T
wx +
∂w
∂N
∂
∂w
T
wx . It follows from Eq. (78) that
∂
∂N
T
wx < 0. Using Eq. (76), we
have
∂w
∂N
= −(1− γ) γ (α− c)
(2− 3γ + γN)2 < 0. (79)
Finally, using Eq. (78), we have
∂
∂w
T
wx
= θS
(
θSw − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN)
)
−
(
θS (w − c) + θT2 c
)
(
θSw − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN)
)2 . (80)
The fact that Twx ∈ (0, 1) implies θSw − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN) > θS (w − c) + θT2 c, which in turn implies
∂
∂w
T
wx > 0. Therefore,
d
dN
T
wx < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
From Eq. (78), we have ddγ
T
wx =
∂
∂γ
T
wx +
∂w
∂γ
∂
∂w
T
wx . It also follows from Eq. (78) that
∂
∂γ
T
wx < 0.
Using Eq. (76), we have
∂w
∂γ
= − (α− c) (N − 1)
(2− 3γ + γN)2 < 0. (81)
Finally, we know from the proof of Proposition 2a that ∂∂w
T
wx > 0. Therefore,
d
dγ
T
wx < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
We know from (78) and (76) that as t→ 0,
w∗ → α (1− γ) + c (1− 2γ + γN)
2− 3γ + γN , and (82)
T ∗
w∗x∗
→ θS (w
∗ − c) + θT2 c
θSw∗ − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN)
. (83)
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It is straightforward to show that the single–supplier solution satisfies
wM → α+ c
2
, and (84)
TM
wMxM
→ θS
(
wM − c)+ θT2 c
θSwM − θRc . (85)
We know from the proof of Proposition 2a that ∂∂w
T
wx > 0, and it is straightforward to show that
w∗ < wM and (1−γ)N(1−2γ+γN) < 1. Therefore, as t→ 0, we have
T ∗
w∗x∗
=
θS (w
∗ − c) + θT2 c
θSw∗ − θRc (1−γ)N(1−2γ+γN)
<
θS
(
wM − c)+ θT2 c
θSwM − θRc (1−γ)N(1−2γ+γN)
<
θS
(
wM − c)+ θT2 c
θSwM − θRc =
TM
wMxM
,
(86)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3
It is straightforward to show that the solution to problem (17) satisfies
TFB (w, x)
wx
=
θS (w − c) + θRc
θSw + θRc
. (87)
Using Eq. (85) and Eq. (87), as t→ 0, we have
TM
wMxM
>
TFB
(
wM , xM
)
wMxM
(88)
⇐⇒ θS
(
wM − c)+ θT2 c
θSwM − θRc >
θS
(
wM − c)+ θRc
θSwM + θRc
(89)
⇐⇒ θSθR
(
wM − c)+ θT
2
(
θSw
M + θRc
)
> (θS − θR) θRc. (90)
Using Eq. (84) and α = cm, the last inequality is equivalent to
m >
3θSθR − 2θ2R − θT θR − 0.5θT θS
θRθS + 0.5θT θS
, (91)
and the result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Using (10) and the fact that m > 1, it is easy to see that θT2 (θS + θR) c− θRθSc < 0. Using Eq.
(83) and Eq. (87), as t→ 0, we have
T ∗
w∗x∗
<
TFB (w∗, x∗)
w∗x∗
(92)
⇐⇒ θS (w
∗ − c) + θT2 c
θSw∗ − θR (1−γ)cN(1−2γ+γN)
− θS (w
∗ − c) + θRc
θSw∗ + θRc
< 0 (93)
⇐⇒ θR (θS (w
∗ − c) + θRc) (1− γ)
N (1− 2γ + γN) − θRθSc+
θT (θSw
∗ + θRc)
2
< 0, (94)
where w∗ is defined in Eq. (82). It is straightforward to show that the LHS of (94) is decreasing in γ
and N . Furthermore, as γ → 1 or N →∞, the LHS of (94) approaches θT2 (θS + θR) c− θRθSc < 0.
Thus, there are γ¯ < 1 and N¯ <∞ such that inequality (94) holds if and only if γ > γ¯ or N > N¯ .
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Appendix B: Numerical solution used for calibration
In this appendix, we provide details on the numerical procedure used in the model’s calibration.
In particular, we describe how we match equilibrium quantities – the Herfindahl index of supplier
shares and the mean profit margin of suppliers – to their empirical counterparts.
Note that when Nj > 2 and α1 is normalized to 1, the number of parameters that we can vary
(α2, ..., αNj ,m) exceeds the number of equilibrium quantities that we are trying to match to the data
(HHI∗j and
∑Nj
i=1
(
w∗i
ci
−1
)
Nj
). In other words, there are multiple combinations of demand intercepts
that lead to the same equilibrium HHI of supplier shares. Ideally, we would like to find the values
of demand intercepts that match each supplier’s equilibrium share of customer’s revenues, SH∗i ,
to that in the data. However, as we discuss below, this is, in general, computationally infeasible.
Thus, to narrow down the set of possible combinations of demand intercepts, we make the following
identifying assumption: out of Nj suppliers, N
′
j suppliers have a common demand intercept α
′,
whereas N ′′j = Nj −N ′j suppliers have a common demand intercept α′′. The identification of N ′j is
discussed below.
For each retailer–level observation and for given values of m, Nj , N
′
j , α
′, and α′′, we solve the
model numerically using the following steps:
(i) We assume starting values of wholesale prices and trade credit limits of each supplier, wi and
Ti respectively for supplier i; starting values are symmetrical across all suppliers;
(ii) We find the optimal quantities demanded by the retailer, x1, x2, ..., xNj , by maximizing its
profit, Πj , given in (4);
(iii) We vary the wholesale price and trade credit limit of one supplier, k, with demand intercept
α′, w′i and T
′
i respectively; repeat step (ii), compute the resulting profit of supplier k, ΠSk given in
(7); and find the combination of w∗k and T
∗
k that maximizes ΠSk ;
(iv) If N ′j > 1, we assign the values of w
∗
k and T
∗
k to all suppliers whose demand intercept is α
′;
(v) We vary the wholesale price and trade credit limit of one supplier, l, with demand intercept
α′′, w′′i and T
′′
i respectively; repeat step (ii), compute the resulting profit of that supplier, ΠSl , and
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find the combination of w∗l and T
∗
l that maximizes ΠSl ;
(vi) If N ′′j > 1, we assign the values of w
∗
l and T
∗
l to all suppliers whose demand intercept is α
′′;
(vii) We repeat steps (iii)–(vi) until convergence, which occurs when the absolute difference in
|wk + Tk + wl + Tl| between two adjacent iterations is lower than a certain limit. With a limit of
10−6, the typical number of iterations until convergence is between 5 and 20. Note that allowing
for larger heterogeneity of demand intercepts, i.e., more than two values of αi, raises the number
of iterations until convergence and thus the computational time dramatically.
We repeat the procedure above for each integer N ′j between 1 and Nj − 1 and for a fine grid of
values of m, α′, and α′′. For each N ′j we pick the combination of m, α
′, and α′′ that matches the
model–based HHI of equilibrium supplier shares of customer j, HHI∗j , and the equilibrium mean
profit margin of customer j’s suppliers,
∑Nj
i=1
(
w∗i
ci
−1
)
Nj
, to their empirical counterparts. The procedure
concludes when the absolute difference between the model HHI∗j and its empirical counterpart is
below 10−3 and the absolute difference between
∑Nj
i=1
(
w∗i
ci
−1
)
Nj
and the mean profit margin in the
data, 0.093, is below 10−3 as well. Given the available degrees of freedom, we choose N ′j to match
as closely as possible the share of customer j’s purchases from the supplier with the largest share.
We denote the chosen values of model parameters for customer j as N̂ ′j , m̂j , α̂
′
j , and α̂
′′
j .
We record the following equilibrium values of the model’s numerical solution that uses the
parameters equal to N̂ ′j , m̂j , α̂
′
j , and α̂
′′
j :
(i) the equilibrium proportion of sales of each supplier financed by trade credit,
T ∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
for supplier i;
(ii) the equilibrium proportion of purchases of customer j financed by trade credit:
∑Nj
i=1 T
∗
i∑Nj
i=1 w
∗
i x
∗
i
;
(iii) the number of customer j’s suppliers, Nj ;
(iv) the mean product substitutability of customer j’s suppliers, γj ;
(v) the Herfindahl index of customer j’s supplier shares, HHI∗j .
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Simulated data
This table presents summary statistics for the simulated sample of 2,781 suppliers (Panel A) and 571 retailers
(Panel B). Supplier i’s trade credit is the equilibrium proportion of its sales done on credit,
T∗i
w∗i x
∗
i
. Retailer j’s
trade credit is the equilibrium proportion of its purchases financed by trade credit,
∑Nj
i=1 T
∗
i∑Nj
i=1 w
∗
i x
∗
i
, where Nj is the
number of retailer j’s suppliers. Share of supplier i’s that sells to retailer j is computed as SHi =
SALEi∑Nj
k=1 SALEk
.
Retailer j’s Herfindahl index (HHI) of supplier shares is computed as HHIj =
∑Nj
i=1 SH
2
i(∑Nj
i=1 SHi
)2 . Mean product
substitutability among all suppliers selling to retailer j is computed as γj =
∑Nj
i=1
∑Nj
i′ 6=i γi,i′
Nj(Nj−1) , where γi,i′ is the
textual similarity of product descriptions of suppliers i and i′, as described in Subsection 4.1.
Whole sample 2 ≤ # suppliers ≤ 5 # suppliers ≥ 6
# supp. = 2,781 # supp. = 947 # supp. = 1,834
# ret. = 571 # ret. = 326 # ret. = 245
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Panel A: Suppliers
Trade credit 0.4882 0.0316 0.4984 0.0109 0.4830 0.0321
Supplier share 0.2109 0.3255 0.3442 0.4105 0.1420 0.0469
Mean product substitutability 0.0081 0.0180 0.0076 0.0175 0.0083 0.0144
Panel B: Retailers
Trade credit 0.4922 0.0240 0.5005 0.0080 0.4812 0.0360
HHI of supplier shares 0.3174 0.2994 0.4722 0.1455 0.1115 0.0996
Mean product substitutability 0.0077 0.0239 0.0074 0.0195 0.0080 0.0206
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Table 2: Supplier and retailer trade credit, supplier share, HHI of supplier shares,
and product substitutability: Simulated data
Panel A presents regressions of a supplier’s equilibrium trade credit on the supplier’s share of the retailer’s
purchases and mean substitutability among suppliers’ products. Panel B presents regressions of a retailer’s
equilibrium trade credit on the HHI of supplier shares and mean substitutability among suppliers’ products.
See Table 1 for variable definitions. The samples of 2,781 suppliers and 571 retailers are simulated to match
certain quantities in real data, as described in detail in Subsection 4.3. Standard errors of coefficients are
reported below the coefficient estimates. The numbers in curly brackets indicate the economic significance
of the corresponding coefficient, computed as the coefficient estimate multiplied by the in-sample standard
deviation of the independent variable and divided by the in-sample standard deviation of the dependent
variable.
Whole sample 2 ≤ # suppliers ≤ 5 # suppliers ≥ 6
Panel A: Suppliers
Intercept 0.4935 0.4974 0.4913
(505.62) (-669.89) (396.48)
Supplier share 0.0434 0.0157 0.0832
(11.73) (8.89) (8.65)
{0.447} {0.591} {0.245}
Mean product substitutability -1.9050 -0.5818 -2.4443
(-43.45) (-21.27) (-61.67)
{-1.085} {-0.934} {-1.097}
R squared 76.27% 62.46% 93.10%
Panel B: Retailers
Intercept 0.4894 0.4941 0.4876
(394.73) (493.06) (279.50)
HHI of supplier shares 0.0389 0.0196 0.0951
(12.73) (9.90) (7.99)
{0.485} {0.356} {0.263}
Mean product substitutability -1.1861 -0.3831 -2.1918
(-27.05) (-17.91) (-56.54)
{-1.181} {-0.934} {-1.258}
R squared 61.87% 57.64% 92.97%
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Table 3: Suppliers and retailers: Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of suppliers in Panel A and for the sample of retailers
in Panel B. The sample period is 1996–2009. The sample of suppliers includes 2,781 observations of suppliers
that sell to at least one retailer (NAICS 2-digit industry 44 or 45) that has at least 2 suppliers. The sample
of retailers includes 571 observations of retailers that have at least 2 suppliers. Customer-supplier links are
based on the extended version of Cohen and Frazzini’s (2008) data set. Trade credit for suppliers is the
ratio of accounts receivable, Compustat item AR, and book assets, item AT. Trade credit for retailers is the
ratio of accounts payable, item AP, and book assets. Mean supplier share is computed as in (28). HHI of
supplier shares is computed as in (30). Mean product substitutability is computed as in (29) for the sample
of suppliers, and as in (31) for the sample of retailers. Book assets is item AT. Age is the difference between
the year of the observation on the one hand and the founding year, incorporation year, or the year the firm
first appears in CRSP/Compustat in this order of availability on the other hand. Profit margin is operating
profitability, computed as the ratio of item OIADP to item SALE. Sales growth is year-to-year percentage
change in SALE. Tangibility is the ratio of capital stock to book assets. Capital stock is estimated using the
perpetual inventory model of PP&E, described in Section 6.2.2. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and marketable
securities, item CHE, to book assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt, items
DLC and DLTT, respectively, and the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and the market value of equity,
given by CSHO × PRCC C. R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures, item XRD, and book assets. Advertising is
the ratio of advertising expenditures, item XAD, and book assets. Hadlock and Pierce index is computed as
(−0.737×Size)+(0.043×Size2)−(0.040×Age), where size is measured as log book assets, inflation adjusted
to 2004 and capped at $4.5 billion, and age is capped at 37. Constrained (Unconstrained) is a dummy variable
that equals one if the firm’s Hadlock and Pierce index is in the top (bottom) deciles. Investment grade rating
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a rating above BBB−. Rating present is a dummy variable
that equals one if the firm has debt rating available. Standardized goods, differentiated goods, and services
are dummy variables that equal one if the supplier belongs to the corresponding industry, according to
Rauch’s (1999) classification. Proportions of standardized inputs, differentiated inputs, and service inputs
are continuous variables ranging between 0 and 1, and defined in Rauch (1999). Proportion of finished
inventory is the ratio of inventory of finished goods, item INVFG, to total inventory, item INVT. Industry
share is the ratio of the firm’s sales to total sales in the firm’s 3-digit SIC industry. Industry HHI is the
Herfindahl index of sales within the firm’s 3-digit SIC industry. All ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
of their distributions.
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Suppliers and retailers: Summary statistics – Continued
Panel A: Suppliers Panel B: Retailers
Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev
Trade credit 0.159 0.142 0.117 0.234 0.110 0.303
Mean supplier share 0.211 0.204 0.366
HHI of supplier shares 0.317 0.296 0.299
Mean product substitutability 0.008 0.002 0.018 0.008 0.002 0.024
Book assets 3,431 267 43,201 98,636 9,041 318,826
Age 32.104 19 37.326 62.357 47 48.446
Profit margin 0.058 0.072 0.192 0.093 0.066 0.090
Sales growth 0.089 0.067 0.239 0.105 0.083 0.219
Tangibility 0.126 0.071 0.168 0.237 0.239 0.178
Liquidity 0.118 0.048 0.160 0.089 0.054 0.091
Leverage 0.267 0.210 0.246 0.256 0.170 0.228
R&D 0.021 0 0.062 0 0 0.006
Advertising 0.035 0.030 0.038 0.029 0.024 0.033
Hadlock-Pierce index -1.403 -1.130 1.145 -3.301 -3.926 0.882
Constrained 0.311 0 0.463 0.007 0 0.083
Unconstrained 0.457 0 0.498 0.965 1 0.184
Investment grade rating 0.141 0 0.348 0.559 1 0.497
Rating present 0.207 0 0.405 0.709 1 0.454
Standardized goods 0.401 0 0.490
Differentiated goods 0.313 0 0.464
Services 0.176 0 0.381
Proportion standardized inputs 0.550 0.620 0.192
Proportion differentiated inputs 0.264 0.290 0.095
Proportion services inputs 0.077 0.090 0.030
Proportion finished inventory 0.436 0.504 0.361 0.059 0 0.235
Industry share 0.252 0.205 0.197 0.256 0.191 0.180
Industry HHI 0.089 0.013 0.180 0.236 0.182 0.207
# Obs. 2,781 571
60
Table 4: Supplier trade credit, supplier share, and product substitutability
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of suppliers’ trade credit in (26). See Table 3
for the variable definitions. The sample period is 1996–2009. The sample includes 2,781 observations of
suppliers that sell to at least one retailer that has at least 2 suppliers. The regressions include year fixed
effects and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by supplier. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.180 0.172 0.164 0.174
(54.33) (24.76) (21.81) (24.50)
Mean supplier share 0.024 0.029 0.024
(1.75) (2.01) (1.66)
Mean product substitutability -0.731 -0.687 -0.638
(-6.19) (-5.15) (-5.29)
Differentiated goods 0.039 0.042 0.040
(13.31) (13.94) (14.08)
Services 0.010 0.014 0.014
(2.25) (2.96) (2.78)
Unconstrained 0.005 0.006 0.005
(2.10) (2.38) (2.04)
Constrained 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.16) (0.27) (0.26)
Investment grade rating 0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.23) (0.70) (0.51)
Liquidity 0.014 0.009 0.014
(0.71) (0.47) (0.69)
Leverage -0.061 -0.063 -0.060
(-4.01) (-4.29) (-3.88)
Profit margin -0.025 -0.026 -0.023
(-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.75)
Sales growth 0.035 0.035 0.036
(3.44) (3.34) (3.42)
Advertising 0.035 0.047 0.041
(1.49) (2.01) (1.84)
R&D -0.022 -0.031 -0.024
(-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.52)
Supplier industry share -0.012 -0.017 -0.008
(-1.33) (-1.70) (-0.90)
Supplier industry HHI -0.079 -0.072 -0.080
(-7.60) (-7.10) (-7.59)
# Obs. 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781
R squared 1.84% 9.83% 9.74% 9.52%
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Table 5: Retailer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutability
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of retailers’ trade credit in (27). See Table 3 for
the variable definitions. The sample period is 1996–2009. The sample includes 571 observations of retailers
that have at least two suppliers. The regressions include year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS.
Standard errors are clustered by retailer. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.202 0.651 0.635 0.552
(14.22) (11.82) (12.46) (11.88)
HHI of supplier shares 0.139 0.091 0.104
(4.95) (3.23) (3.62)
Mean product substitutability -2.057 -1.034 -1.221
(-8.05) (-2.24) (-2.61)
Proportion finished inventory -0.019 -0.016 -0.020
(-2.02) (-2.62) (-2.00)
Proportion differentiated inputs 1.511 1.493 1.335
(13.64) (13.54) (12.83)
Proportion service inputs -0.992 -0.991 -0.913
(-9.57) (-10.40) (-10.63)
Unconstrained -0.013 -0.003 -0.013
(-0.31) (-0.08) (-0.31)
Constrained 0.035 0.041 0.031
(1.74) (1.85) (1.64)
Investment grade rating 0.048 0.049 0.066
(4.07) (4.15) (5.85)
Liquidity 0.049 0.036 0.081
(0.69) (0.50) (1.24)
Leverage 0.188 0.190 0.214
(5.82) (6.02) (6.64)
Tangibility -0.336 -0.336 -0.332
(-10.15) (-10.51) (-9.83)
Sales growth 0.062 0.060 0.060
(2.61) (2.42) (2.44)
Retailer industry share 0.061 0.054 0.038
(3.16) (2.56) (2.13)
Retailer industry HHI -0.012 -0.005 0.026
(-0.53) (-0.23) (1.36)
# Obs. 571 571 571 571
R squared 6.48% 78.86% 77.79% 78.13%
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Table A2: Supplier trade credit, supplier share, and product substitutability:
Alternative independent variables
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of suppliers’ trade credit in (17) using some
alternative independent variables. Mean supplier share (W) is the retailer-purchases-weighted mean supplier
share defined in Subsection 6.2.1. Mean product substitutability (W) is the retailer-purchases-weighted mean
product substitutability, also defined in Subsection 6.2.1. Log(book assets) and Log(age) refer to the natural
logarithms of book assets, Compustat item AT, and age, respectively. Liquidity (cash) is the ratio of cash, item
CH, to book assets, item AT. Supplier industry share (2-digit) and (4-digit) are the ratios of the supplier’s
sales, item SALE, to total sales in the supplier’s 2-digit and 4-digit SIC industries, respectively. Supplier
industry HHI (2-digit) and (4-digit) are the Herfindahl indexes of sales concentration in the supplier’s 2-digit
and 4-digit industries, respectively. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent and other independent
variables. The sample period is 1996-2009. The sample includes 2,781 observations of suppliers that sell to
at least one retailer (NAICS 2-digit industry 44 or 45) that has at least 2 suppliers. The regressions include
year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by supplier. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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Supplier trade credit, supplier share, and product substitutability: Alternative
independent variables – Continued
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.172 0.172 0.179 0.168 0.173 0.175 0.16 0.166
(24.76) (23.77) (31.90) (25.55) (25.15) (27.83) (20.09) (23.06)
Mean supplier share 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.026
(2.01) (2.19) (2.04) (2.18) (1.96) (1.75) (1.86)
Mean supplier share (W) 0.026
(1.56)
Mean product substitutability -0.687 -0.687 -0.651 -0.714 -0.657 -0.585 -0.685
(-5.15) (-5.07) (-5.04) (-5.40) (-4.68) (-4.59) (-4.75)
Mean product substitutability (W) -0.618
(-6.28)
Differentiated goods 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.036 0.042
(13.31) (13.44) (13.42) (13.83) (12.67) (12.95) (11.59) (13.98)
Services 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.013
(2.25) (2.35) (2.10) (2.57) (1.96) (2.58) (4.20) (2.64)
Unconstrained 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
(2.10) (2.11) (2.38) (1.98) (2.60) (1.86) (2.26)
Constrained 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.70) (0.39) (-0.22) (0.28)
Hadlock-Pierce index 0.007
(2.28)
Log(book assets) 0.018
(4.21)
Log(age) 0.003
(1.18)
Investment grade rating 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.23) (0.35) (1.33) (0.12) (-0.18) (0.18) (0.57)
Rating present 0.013
(2.59)
Liquidity 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.022 0.016
(0.71) (0.67) (0.66) (0.83) (0.54) (1.10) (0.84)
Liquidity (cash) 0.023
(1.94)
Leverage -0.061 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.060 -0.051 -0.065 -0.059
(-4.01) (-4.00) (-4.07) (-4.08) (-4.12) (-3.89) (-4.25) (-4.16)
Profit margin -0.025 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 -0.032 -0.015 -0.023
(-0.82) (-0.80) (-0.72) (-0.71 (-0.79) ) (-1.03) (-0.49) (-0.75)
Sales growth 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.034 0.033 0.038 0.037
(3.44) (3.33) (3.36) (3.70) (3.23) (3.10) (3.58) (3.49)
Advertising 0.035 0.038 0.031 0.038 0.029 0.030 0.046 0.033
(1.49) (1.58) (1.28) (1.61) (1.24) (1.27) (1.85) (1.36)
R&D -0.022 -0.029 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 0.008 -0.009
(-0.47) (-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.44) (0.16) (-0.20)
Supplier industry share -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.017 -0.002 -0.014
(-1.33) (-1.26) (-0.31) (-1.82) (-0.15) (-1.67)
Supplier industry share (2-digit) 0.010
(0.25)
Supplier industry share (4-digit) -0.018
(-2.59)
Supplier industry HHI -0.079 -0.078 -0.082 -0.081 -0.085 -0.077
(-7.60) (-7.43) (-8.13) (-7.76) (-8.33) (-7.48)
Supplier industry HHI (2-digit) -0.101
(-4.06)
Supplier industry HHI (4-digit) -0.047
(-4.69)
# Obs. 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781
R squared 9.83% 9.80% 9.99% 9.94% 10.02% 9.61% 9.58% 9.65%
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Table A3: Supplier trade credit, supplier share, and product substitutability:
Alternative samples
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of suppliers’ trade credit in (17) using several
subsamples of suppliers. The subsample in column 1 (2, 3) includes 2,691 (2,592; 2,397) suppliers at least
25% (50%, 100%) of whose sales are to retailers. A customer’s share of the supplier’s total sales is assumed
to be proportional to that customer’s cost of goods sold. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent and
independent variables. The sample period is 1996-2009. The regressions include year fixed effects and are
estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by supplier. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
% cust. retailers ≥ 25 % cust. retailers ≥ 50 % cust. retailers = 100
Intercept 0.175 0.172 0.171
(28.14) (25.81) (24.09)
Mean supplier share 0.029 0.024 0.022
(2.17) (1.73) (1.52)
Mean product substitutability -0.605 -0.625 -0.597
(-4.59) (-4.52) (-4.56)
Differentiated goods 0.037 0.041 0.041
(13.75) (12.92) (12.74)
Services 0.010 0.007 0.004
(2.00) (1.80) (0.80)
Unconstrained 0.005 0.004 0.005
(2.25) (1.87) (2.18)
Constrained 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
Investment grade rating 0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.35) (-0.48) (-0.46)
Liquidity 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.39) (0.24) (0.36)
Leverage 0.056 0.056 0.059
(3.94) (3.41) (3.42)
Profit margin -0.023 -0.008 -0.008
(-0.90) (-0.23) (-0.22)
Sales growth 0.035 0.039 0.038
(3.40) (3.19) (3.12)
Advertising 0.044 0.046 0.045
(1.92) (1.77) (1.77)
R&D -0.021 0.023 0.031
(-0.46) (0.50) (0.68)
Supplier industry share -0.015 -0.009 -0.007
(-1.62) (-0.83) (-0.65)
Supplier industry HHI -0.082 -0.074 -0.073
(-7.71) (-6.50) (-6.20)
# Obs. 2,691 2,592 2,397
R squared 9.28% 10.56% 10.74%
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Table A5: Retailer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutabil-
ity: Alternative independent variables
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of retailers’ trade credit in (18) using some
alternative independent variables. Mean product substitutability (W) is the supplier-sales-weighted mean
product substitutability defined in Subsection 6.2.2. Log(book assets) and Log(age) refer to the natural
logarithms of book assets, Compustat item AT, and age, respectively. Liquidity (cash) is the ratio of cash,
item CH, to book assets, item AT. Tangibility (20% depreciation) is computed similarly to Tangibility, but it
assumes 20% annual depreciation rate of physical capital. Retailer industry share (2-digit) and (4-digit) are
the ratios of the retailer’s sales, item SALE, to total sales in the retailer’s 2-digit and 4-digit SIC industries,
respectively. Retailer industry HHI (2-digit) and (4-digit) are the Herfindahl indexes of sales concentration
in the retailer’s 2-digit and 4-digit industries, respectively. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent
and other independent variables. The sample period is 1996-2009. The sample includes 571 observations of
retailers that have at least two suppliers. The regressions include year fixed effects and are estimated using
OLS. Standard errors are clustered by retailer. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Retailer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutability:
Alternative independent variables – Continued
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.651 0.647 0.640 0.653 0.668 0.670 0.632 0.667 0.651
(11.82) (10.93) (10.43) (11.02) (13.23) (12.70) (11.11) (12.99) (11.53)
HHI of supplier shares 0.091 0.087 0.113 0.101 0.091 0.087 0.118 0.081 0.080
(3.23) (2.52) (3.22) (2.89) (3.23) (3.00) (4.00) (2.43) (2.74)
Mean product substitutability -1.034 -0.964 -0.998 -1.034 -0.971 -1.240 -1.126 -1.239
(-2.24) (-2.14) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-1.79) (-2.86) (-2.91) (-3.07)
Mean product substitutability (W) -0.922
(-3.22)
Proportion finished inventories -0.019 -0.012 -0.065 -0.026 -0.003 -0.012 -0.021 -0.003 -0.005
(-2.02) (-1.55) (-2.84) (-2.00) (-0.45) (-0.91) (-2.42) (-0.44) (-0.62)
Proportion differentiated inputs 1.511 1.487 1.502 1.500 1.513 1.507 1.651 1.537 1.428
(13.64) (13.43) (13.54) (13.29) (13.59) (14.02) (14.11) (15.43) (13.94)
Proportion service inputs -0.992 -1.000 -0.994 -0.989 -1.011 -0.999 -1.042 -0.998 -0.973
(-9.57) (-10.24) (-9.58) (-9.45) (-15.18) (-14.22) (-11.61) (-13.83) (-12.84)
Unconstrained -0.013 -0.024 -0.009 0.008 -0.049 -0.013 -0.014
(-0.31) (-0.59) (-0.22) (0.19) (-1.24) (-0.32) (-0.34)
Constrained 0.035 0.031 0.041 0.056 0.028 0.025 0.036
(1.74) (1.49) (1.91) (2.06) (1.69) (1.60) (1.75)
Hadlock-Pierce index -0.032
(-2.35)
Log(book assets) 0.178
(4.75)
Log(age) 0.034
(1.22)
Investment grade rating 0.048 0.049 0.044 0.041 0.036 0.040 0.051 0.045
(4.07) (4.16) (3.86) (3.65) (3.29) (2.93) (4.74) (4.09)
Rating present 0.031
(2.70)
Tangibility -0.336 -0.311 -0.519 -0.401 -0.328 -0.367 -0.301 -0.343
(-10.15) (-7.74) (-6.49) (-6.99) (-9.36) (-12.00) (-9.02) (-10.53)
Tangibility (20% depreciation) -0.223
(-4.01)
Liquidity 0.049 0.044 0.165 0.104 0.017 0.179 0.022 0.050
(0.69) (0.64) (0.99) (0.76) (0.25) (2.73) (0.33) (0.70)
Liquidity (cash) -0.073
(-1.37)
Leverage 0.188 0.183 0.574 0.199 0.183 0.159 0.224 0.184 0.194
(5.82) (5.50) (6.22) (5.40) (5.87) (5.33) (6.24) (5.79) (5.86)
Sales growth 0.062 0.054 0.163 0.169 0.065 0.058 0.084 0.065 0.063
(2.61) (2.24) (3.30) (3.44) (2.57) (2.58) (2.93) (2.79) (2.61)
Retailer industry share 0.061 0.047 0.084 0.46 0.048 0.056 0.069
(3.16) (2.27) (2.64) (2.02) (2.72) (3.02) (3.48)
Retailer industry share (2-digit) 0.142
(8.35)
Retailer industry share (4-digit) 0.053
(2.81)
Retailer industry HHI -0.012 -0.019 0.015 -0.026 -0.015 -0.009 -0.035
(-0.53) (-0.94) (0.29) (-1.03) (-0.64) (-0.38) (-1.42)
Retailer industry HHI (2-digit) -0.141
(-2.83)
Retailer industry HHI (4-digit) 0.024
(1.35)
# Obs. 571 571 571 571 571 571 571 571 571
R squared 78.86% 79.01% 78.91% 79.22% 78.65% 78.65% 76.70% 79.55% 78.73%
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Table A6: Customer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutabil-
ity: Alternative samples
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of customers’ trade credit in (18) using alternative
samples of customers. In column 1, the sample includes 232 wholesalers, defined as firms having two-digit
NAICS code 42, that have at least two suppliers. In column 2, the sample includes 2,705 firms that are
neither retailers (NAICS codes 44-45) nor wholesalers, and have at least two suppliers. In column 3, the
sample includes 3,508 firms that have at least two suppliers. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent
and independent variables. The sample period is 1996-2009. The regressions include year fixed effects and
are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by retailer. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Wholesalers Not retailers All customers
or wholesalers
Intercept 0.692 0.193 0.159
(3.23) (7.31) (7.23)
HHI of supplier shares 0.048 0.028 0.022
(2.17) (2.67) (2.56)
Mean product substitutability -0.396 -0.103 -0.113
(-2.68) (-2.01) (-2.21)
Proportion finished inventories -0.026 -0.015 -0.019
(-1.54) (-1.58) (-2.82)
Proportion differentiated inputs 0.439 0.037 0.115
(3.22) (0.51) (2.17)
Proportion service inputs -0.459 -0.095 -0.155
(-3.60) (-5.46) (-11.79)
Unconstrained -0.079 0.017 -0.008
(-3.91) (1.51) (-0.45)
Constrained 0.027 0.040 0.051
(0.49) (1.62) (2.02)
Investment grade rating 0.026 0.035 0.082
(2.73) (4.21) (14.04)
Tangibility -0.048 -0.021 -0.055
(-0.95) (-0.77) (-2.16)
Liquidity 1.210 0.189 0.346
(9.33) (4.23) (8.47)
Leverage 0.123 0.006 0.181
(2.64) (0.28) (6.01)
Sales growth 0.057 0.006 0.032
(2.73) (0.39) (2.02)
Customer industry share 0.066 0.043 0.127
(1.87) (2.06) (7.93)
Customer industry HHI -0.085 -0.045 -0.046
(-1.48) (-1.26) (-1.29)
# Obs. 232 2,705 3,508
R squared 70.09% 64.34% 70.68%
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Table A7: Retailer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutabil-
ity: High and low interest rate subsamples
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of customers’ trade credit in (18) for two sub-
samples: below-annual-median and above-annual-median non-trade-credit interest rates. Non-trade-credit
interest rate is defined as the ratio of interest expense to the sum of beginning-of-year short-term and long-
term debt. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent and independent variables. The sample period
is 1996-2009. The regressions include year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are
clustered by retailer. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Below-median Above-median
interest rate interest rate
Intercept 0.111 0.859
(1.29) (10.80)
HHI of supplier shares 0.098 0.186
(2.11) (3.12)
Mean product substitutability -1.760 -2.411
(-3.59) (-4.79)
Proportion finished inventory -0.010 -0.020
(-0.72) (-1.35)
Proportion differentiated inputs 2.343 1.456
(13.46) (8.51)
Proportion service inputs -0.034 -1.808
(-0.21) (-11.68)
Unconstrained -0.004 -0.012
(-0.06) (-0.19)
Constrained 0.014 0.053
(0.45) (1.79)
Investment grade rating 0.036 0.007
(1.94) (0.39)
Liquidity 0.055 0.047
(0.49) (0.45)
Leverage 0.238 0.084
(4.96) (1.81)
Tangibility -0.078 0.021
(-1.63) (0.43)
Sales growth 0.109 0.079
(3.19) (2.21)
Retailer industry share 0.053 -0.008
(1.79) (-0.26)
Retailer industry HHI 0.002 -0.019
(0.06) (-0.55)
# Obs. 285 286
R squared 80.15% 71.86%
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Table A8: Supplier trade credit, supplier share, and product substitutability:
Including higher-order terms
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of suppliers’ trade credit in (17), while augmenting
the regressions by the quadratic and cubic terms of mean supplier share and of mean product substitutability.
We multiply the square of mean product substitutability by 100 and its cube by 10,000. See Table 3 for the
definitions of the dependent and independent variables. The sample period is 1996-2009. The regressions
include year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by supplier. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.172 0.171 0.170 0.166
(24.76) (24.78) (24.54) (24.24)
Mean supplier share 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.022
(1.75) (1.66) (1.72) (1.61)
Mean supplier share2 0.031 0.031
(1.03) (1.03)
Mean supplier share3 -0.128 -0.130
(-0.44) (-0.45)
Mean product substitutability -0.731 -0.752 -0.661 -0.674
(-6.19) (-6.37) (-5.43) (-5.57)
Mean product substitutability2 ×100 -0.125 -0.123
(-2.34) (-2.29)
Mean product substitutability3 ×10, 000 0.076 0.077
(1.42) (1.45)
Differentiated goods 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.039
(13.31) (12.93) (13.25) (13.37)
Services 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(2.25) (2.28) (2.32) (2.34)
Unconstrained 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(2.10) (2.16) (2.14) (2.12)
Constrained 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Investment grade rating 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Liquidity 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.71) (0.73) (0.72) (0.74)
Leverage -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062
(-4.01) (-4.04) (-4.09) (-4.06)
Profit margin -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.83)
Sales growth 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.035
(3.44) (3.46) (3.52) (3.49)
Advertising 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.034
(1.49) (1.47) (1.45) (1.45)
R&D -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46)
Supplier industry share -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
(-1.33) (-1.36) (-1.39) (-1.40)
Supplier industry HHI -0.079 -0.079 -0.079 -0.080
(-7.60) (-7.64) (-7.62) (-7.67)
# Obs. 2,781 2,781 2,781 2,781
R squared 9.83% 9.98% 10.13% 10.21%
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Table A9: Retailer trade credit, HHI of supplier shares, and product substitutabil-
ity: Including higher-order terms
This table presents the results of estimating the regression of retailers’ trade credit in (18), while augmenting
the regressions by the quadratic and cubic terms of the Herfindahl index of supplier shares and of mean
product substitutability. We multiply the square of mean product substitutability by 100 and its cube by
10,000. See Table 3 for the definitions of the dependent and independent variables. The sample period
is 1996-2009. The regressions include year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are
clustered by retailer. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.651 0.668 0.661 0.636
(11.82) (12.03) (11.92) (11.41)
HHI of supplier shares 0.139 0.127 0.141 0.129
(4.95) (4.51) (5.02) (4.58)
HHI of supplier shares2 -0.045 -0.022
(-1.34) (-0.71)
HHI of supplier shares3 0.200 0.244
(0.96) (1.10)
Mean product substitutability -2.057 -1.960 -2.541 -2.477
(-8.05) (-7.42) (-8.98) (-8.70)
Mean product substitutability2 ×100 0.582 0.418
(2.21) (1.68)
Mean product substitutability3 ×10, 000 0.211 -0.097
(0.65) (-0.42)
Proportion finished inventory -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019
(-2.02) (-2.00) (-1.93) (-2.00)
Proportion differentiated inputs 1.511 1.466 1.478 1.481
(13.64) (13.41) (13.45) (13.45)
Proportion service inputs -0.992 -0.972 -0.979 -1.022
(-9.57) (-9.32) (-9.52) (-9.96)
Unconstrained -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.31)
Constrained 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.035
(1.74) (1.80) (1.81) (1.74)
Investment grade rating 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.050
(4.07) (4.12) (3.99) (4.18)
Liquidity 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.049
(0.69) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69)
Leverage 0.188 0.182 0.189 0.192
(5.82) (5.63) (5.81) (6.02)
Tangibility -0.336 -0.331 -0.325 -0.332
(-10.15) (-9.87) (-9.73) (-10.03)
Sales growth 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.062
(2.61) (2.55) (2.55) (2.64)
Retailer industry share 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.062
(3.16) (3.14) (3.15) (3.26)
Retailer industry HHI -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.53)
# Obs. 571 571 571 571
R squared 78.86% 79.01% 79.15% 79.22%
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